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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR J. ALAN BEESLEY

BEFORE THE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

THURSDAY, JULY 3, 1986

Mr. President,

May I begin by expressing my great pleasure at serving under your very wise chairmanship. May I convey, also, my congratulations to your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria, for his skilful and effective direction of our work.

Mr. President,

As pointed out in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It is unique in its representative membership and its autonomy. It has its own agenda and its own rules. It establishes its own priorities and must take responsibility for the results of its labours, be they meagre or substantial.

We do not, however, conduct our work in a political vacuum. Events around the globe, including important decisions relating to limitations on numbers and types of nuclear weapons, impinge upon our work. Such events necessarily affect not only the atmosphere of this Conference, but also impose adjustments of our priorities. The inter-sessional period from which we have just emerged has

been replete with events and decisions of far - reaching importance for our multilateral negotiations and for many vital issues of arms control and disarmament extending beyond our mandate.

Mr. President,

Speaking as I do, the last in the list of speakers this morning, and as a representative of a member State of NATO, a wholly defensive alliance, I am disappointed to hear statements such as some of those we have heard this morning, questioning Canada's good faith as well as that of its NATO partners concerning our path along the road to arms control. If that is indeed the evaluation made at the last meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, then it is a grossly mistaken evaluation, and I hope this statement that I will now go on to make will give further evidence, if any is needed, to that effect.

#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On the subject of nuclear weapons, the most vital one on our agenda: as always, the relations between the two major nuclear powers, and more specifically their bilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament measures, remain the central determinant of the broader multilateral arms control and disarmament process. This is not to say that this forum does not have a vital role to play on such issues. It does. Indeed, it is more important now than ever before for this multilateral forum to be heard, so that we can build on existing arms control agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral. The ABM Treaty and the SALT agreements remain,

in our view, fundamental building blocks for shaping a more secure future. As Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, stated on May 27, "Canada strongly supports the arms control regime established by the ABM and SALT agreements and believes nothing should be done to undercut their authority." In the same statement, Mr. Clark welcomed the fact that President Reagan had taken decisions which would have the effect, as a matter of practice, of keeping the USA within the SALT II limits over the coming months. Mr. Clark also affirmed that "we take very seriously the USA charges of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements", and emphasized that attention should not be deflected from this problem.

Mr. President,

I shall not comment on the substance of the statement just made by the distinguished representative of the USSR. I do note with interest, however, that this question arising out of a bilateral arms control agreement is being addressed in this multilateral forum, and I welcome this development.

Mr. President,

It is clear that every effort should be made, as soon as possible, to clear up outstanding doubts on matters of compliance. It is a profoundly disturbing possibility that vital arms control measures may come unravelled because of inadequate confidence concerning compliance with such agreements.

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Let me turn for the moment to the subject of conventional arms.

developments concerning the possibilities for negotiated reductions in levels of conventional arms. General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal of April 18 and the further elaboration thereon in the Warsaw Pact communiqué on June 11, as well as the statement by NATO members in Halifax on May 30, are all welcome developments. They reflect a growing, reciprocal awareness of the importance of conventional arms reductions as a necessary element of the broad effort to reduce weapons arsenals of all types. The proposals which have been made involve not only complex questions of substance but also considerations as to the most appropriate negotiating forum and zone of application. Most certainly, in this as in other arms control and disarmament subject areas, verification mechanisms for sustaining mutual confidence in the execution of any agreed measures will be critically important. In addition, the ability of the Stockholm Conference to agree on a substantive package of confidence and security-building measures will be a touchstone for the prospects of negotiating significant reductions in conventional arms. Likewise, in Vienna, a major western initiative is on the table; it has yet to elicit a satisfactory response, but we remain hopeful that one will be forthcoming.

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Since the adjournment of our Spring session, there has occurred a major tragedy at a civilian nuclear energy

facility in Chernobyl, the full consequences of which have yet to be known. We extend our condolences to the government and people of the USSR, through the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, in relation to this tragic event. We owe it to the victims and their families - and to our shared ecology - to draw the proper lessons from it. To this end, Canada will actively participate in the special program in nuclear safety now being organized under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which includes, among other projects, the drafting of international conventions committing the parties to early notification and a coordinated response in case of nuclear emergency or accident with transboundary implications. This long-term program will assist national authorities, with whom primary responsibility for safety must lie, in their efforts to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities in their respective countries. I understand that steps are also being taken in the World Meteorological Organization to lay the groundwork for a more effective monitoring system of atmosphere radiation levels.

One of the more disturbing aspects of the Chernobyl tragedy, as we see it, was its effect in illustrating the fragility of the confidence-building process, and, conversely, the consequences of mistrust. There could hardly be a more persuasive demonstration of the need for greater transparency on such matters. May I take the opportunity of welcoming the

statement we have just heard from the distinguished representative of the USSR. The information he has given us will be subjected to careful study around the world. There are no silver linings to any nuclear cloud but, perhaps, if we can learn from this tragic event, then we can better assure that it does not recur anywhere.

### VERIFICATION

Returning to my theme of verification: it is the consistent, considered and continuing view of the Canadian Government that the answer to problems of verification, compliance and confidence does not lie in the unilateral announcement of changes in practice or in the possible renunciation of important agreements. The answer, rather, lies in meticulous negotiations and incorporation within agreements of specific verification measures agreed to by all parties. Such verification provisions, by effectively deterring non-compliance and by demonstrating compliance, are vital in maintaining necessary confidence and assuring mutual security if the entire arms control and disarmament process is not to go into reverse gear.

The self-sufficient approach to verification, as embodied in a primary reliance on national technical means in bilateral treaties, is not sufficient in all circumstances. In the multilateral context, cooperative institutions, procedures and techniques must be worked out which provide for equitable participation and sharing of responsibility by a multiplicity of parties with diverse interests and differing resources at their disposal.

I will give some illustrations of this in the fields of chemical weapons and Nuclear Test Ban.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: VERIFICATION

On the subject of chemical weapons verification: in our lengthy negotiations directed toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, it has become increasingly apparent, particularly during the spring portion of our 1986 session, that for the purpose of monitoring non-production, there is unlikely to be agreement on the precise substances to be controlled until there is also agreement on exactly what types of controls would be applied. Agreement on verification provisions cannot be put off to the final phase of our negotiation. On April 22, the Soviet delegation put forward proposals relating primarily to the destruction of stocks and of production facilities. These proposals represent a substantive advance on previous Soviet positions and are thus most welcome. If there is to be eventual agreement on a treaty, however, these proposals will need to be supplemented by further proposals relating to the verification of declarations of stocks and of non-production, including at the sites of facilities which will have been destroyed. Agreement on some form of a "challenge inspection" provision will also be required as a necessary "safety net" to ensure that anomalous situations are quickly clarified. Nevertheless, in light of the proposals which have been made, the Canadian delegation has increased hope that these critical issues can begin to be addressed more directly during our present session. The Canadian Government attaches high priority to

further substantive advance on this important agenda item. If there is not significant, substantive progress during our present session, it may become necessary to explore new ways to overcome obstacles to progress in these negotiations.

I would like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation through Ambassador van Schaik to the Government of the Netherlands for the very interesting and useful workshop conducted in The Hague and Rotterdam on aspects of the verification of chemical weapons non-production in the civil chemical industry. The workshop, and the working papers associated with it, constitute a significant contribution to progress on these outstanding issues.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Norwegian Government for the important research it has carried out over the past several years on the sampling and identification of chemical warfare agents. The two papers recently tabled by the Norwegian delegation (CD/703 and CD/704) constitute an important contribution in this area. This work ties in with similar research done by Canadian experts which resulted in the "Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons" tabled in this forum in April.

#### VERIFICATION OF A NTB

I would like to turn now to the subject of verification of a NTB. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement remains a fundamental policy objective of the Canadian Government. Our failure during the first portion of



our session even to reach agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda Item 1 (Nuclear Test Ban) was cause for great disappointment to my delegation. We hope there can be early agreement on a mandate, or on a program of work in the absence of a mandate, which will permit concrete work on the inter-related matters of scope, verification and compliance.

As I indicated in my intervention of March 11, 1986, the Canadian Government has devoted considerable human and financial resources to seismic verification efforts. These include the major upgrading of key seismic facilities in Northern Canada as well as support for basic seismic research at the University of Toronto. Further, Canada proposes to conduct, early in October in Ottawa, a workshop for seismic experts to discuss, and where possible resolve, some of the questions relating to the exchange of level 2 waveform data. This will supplement the largely successful test in late 1984 by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) involving the exchange of level 1 data. It will also build upon the experience of the workshop held in Norway 4-7 June 1985 and reported in CD/599. It is against this background that Canada strongly favours the continued vital work being done by the GSE.

#### PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

Turning now to the question of the prevention of an arms race in Outer Space: the Canadian Government believes that this negotiating body can make a substantive contribution to our shared objective of preventing an arms race in outer

space. It is important that this be done in ways which complement and support, and do not disrupt, the efforts of the USA and the USSR to seek the same objective in their bilateral negotiations.

The lengthy delay in reaching agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on agenda Item 5 (prevention of an arms race in outer space) was therefore cause for much disappointment. However, now that the mandate has been accepted, we can hope that our agreed program of work will permit speedy resumption of substantive discussion of this item. Supplementary to the broad legal survey Canada submitted last year, my delegation intends later in the session to submit a further working paper dealing with selected aspects of legal terminology in relation to outer space. The working paper will, we trust, further elucidate the legality or otherwise of current and contemplated activities in outer space in light of existing treaties and legal precepts.

Canada is also continuing to devote a major effort to its PAXSAT studies, centering on the technical feasibility of using certain types of existing space technologies for verification purposes. The results of these studies will become available in due course. In one of its key aspects, the PAXSAT concept is based on the notion that existing non-classified technology permits the designing of satellites capable of determining with an acceptably high degree of confidence whether other space objects have been designed to perform a weapons function. The Canadian studies are intended

to develop a data base with respect to PAXSAT from which it may be possible to assess other similar related concepts.

VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Returning again to the question of verification in all its aspects:

Mr. President,

In the view of my government, the issues of compliance, verification and confidence-building lie at the heart of the entire arms control and disarmament process. It will be on the successful resolution of these issues that the entire process will stand or fall. As indicated in my statement in Plenary on February 4, 1986, Canada sees the adoption by consensus at UNGA 40 of a resolution affirming the importance of verification as indicating that this is not a partisan issue but a matter on which there is an international consensus. That resolution inter alia invited governments to submit to the Secretary General views on verification. Several have already done so. We hope more will follow. As a country which has taken a lead role in this issue, I think it both appropriate and useful to place before this forum the Canadian Government's response to that resolution. My delegation, therefore, is making available, as official documents of the Conference, the text of the letter of April 14, 1986 to the United Nations Secretary General from Canada's Permanent Representative in New York, together with its accompanying booklet entitled "Verification In All Its Aspects". We think both documents, which have just been distributed to all delegations, merit careful study. Having

in mind the need to economize to meet current financial constraints, my delegation will not require that these documents be processed in all official languages of the Conference.

Mr. President,

In concluding my statement, I should like to renew our earlier plea for the submission of concrete working papers to supplement our statements of policy positions and, in so doing, I compliment the distinguished representative of Pakistan who has just submitted such a paper.