



Statements and Speeches

No. 86/4

ON MAKING A SAFER WORLD

Statement by J. Alan Beesley, Canadian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, before that Conference, Geneva, 11 March 1986.

Mr. President, I wish to comment very briefly today on three of our most important agenda items:

- Item 4: chemical weapons;
- Item 5: prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
- Item 1: nuclear test ban.

It will be recalled that I presented the Canadian position on substantive aspects of each of these items in my plenary statement of February 4, 1986. Today I wish to address the kind of concrete action which the Conference on Disarmament (CD) could, and in our view should, take on each of these items, taking into account that on each subject the conference is at a different stage of consideration, deliberation or negotiation.

Item 4: Chemical Weapons

It is quite clear that the conference is more advanced in its work on the comprehensive convention on chemical weapons than on any other item on its agenda. Thus, it is encouraging, albeit not surprising, that we have been able to re-establish the *ad hoc* committee on chemical weapons on which the conference had agreed at the end of our last session. This should, nevertheless, not be grounds for special satisfaction on our part. When we began this session over a month ago there was a heightened sense of expectation about the prospects for progress in these negotiations. Recent reports of renewed chemical weapons use, which have led the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to initiate an investigation, should have reinforced our concern to make early and urgent progress.

In my statement of February 4, we gave notice of our intention to submit documents intended to advance the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. I wish now to inform the conference that the Canadian document entitled *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons* has been submitted today to the secretariat for distribution to delegations. As I pointed out earlier, this working document identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats to help ensure that the findings of an investigation of alleged chemical weapons use would be as conclusive, convincing, objective and impartial as possible. It reflects Canadian experience and expertise, but also recognizes and benefits from important contributions by several other countries involved in extensive research in this area, particularly Sweden, Norway and Finland.

As stated in the introduction to the document, "such a handbook is both useful today in the context of the existing authority of the Secretary-General under resolution 37/98D or under the Charter of the United Nations; and it should also be of use in the future in the context of a verification regime that would be part of a future chemical weapons convention as it is currently being negotiated in the Con-

erence on Disarmament." The *Handbook*, as some delegations are aware, has already been submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York.

It should be noted that this handbook does not deal with the procedures and criteria leading up to the initiation of an investigation. This issue is still very much a subject for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. The focus of this study is on what investigators should know and do when called upon to implement a decision to conduct an investigation, including the procedures that might be followed and the equipment that might be needed.

A technical working paper dealing with the identification of chemical substances will also soon be tabled in the appropriate Working Group by the Canadian delegation. That paper proposes a method for identifying chemical substances based on Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, which could be of considerable utility in reducing ambiguity in the identification process and in helping to simplify and standardize eventual data flows relating to the implementation of the convention, taking full advantage of computerized methods now available to search chemical literature.

In addition, as mentioned in my earlier statement, we will also be distributing an indexed compendium of all chemical weapons documentation for the period 1983 to 1985 to assist delegations in their work.

In this context I would like to commend the delegation of Pakistan for the serious efforts it has made in addressing in a recent working paper, the first one tabled in the chemical weapons *ad hoc* committee this year, some of the central issues in a future chemical weapons convention. We have noted in particular the statement in the paper that chemical weapons use should be treated as a most serious breach of a future convention. The Canadian government shares this view.

Item 5: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

Turning now to a question on which we have not yet advanced our work nearly as far as we have in the chemical weapons negotiations, namely the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we have already made known our views in our February 4 statement that we should reach agreement quickly on the renewal of last year's mandate. I do not propose to reiterate our views on that issue. I wish merely to announce that the Canadian delegation has given to the secretariat, for distribution to all delegations, a compendium of the 1985 CD documentation on this subject. It is our view that an analysis of that documentation will make clear not only that we have already done considerable useful work in the conference in elucidating the complexities raised by that question, but that considerable work remains to be done in analysing the legal regime and identifying any existing lacunae. Delegations need to address the issues embodied in the compendium. If some delegations disagree with some aspects of the Canadian or British working papers on the legal regime tabled during our last session, then let us hear from them, preferably in the form of working papers. This only underlines the importance as we see it of earliest possible agreement on a renewed mandate so that we can devote our full efforts to concrete, substantive work. In the meantime, all of us should be preparing for such work.

Item 1: Nuclear Test Ban

The third, and perhaps the most important issue I wish to address is that of a comprehensive nuclear

test ban. The extensive number of statements during recent weeks has shown that most delegations share our view as to the importance of this issue. Yet, it has not been possible to establish a subsidiary body which would allow concrete work to be done, particularly on such issues as scope, verification and compliance. Several substantive papers have been tabled on various aspects of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), but we have not yet even begun to discuss them thoroughly. One of the most important aspects raised in statements and working papers on this question relates to seismic verification. Much common ground exists in this area, developed through the intensive work of the group of scientific experts over the years. I wish now to announce that the Canadian delegation is today making available directly to other delegations a brochure recently published by the Department of External Affairs of Canada on seismic verification. Although produced mainly with the Canadian public in mind, this document is the product of extensive research, is based entirely on scientific advice, and is intended to provide useful clarification of some of the issues relating to seismic verification.

Our purpose in distributing this brochure is a simple one. The achievement of a CTB is a fundamental Canadian objective. Canada has played a particularly prominent role on verification, a central issue in which seismic technology is a key. Since 1976, Canadian scientists have participated in the work of the international group of seismic experts (GSE) in the CD studying technical aspects of a world-wide exchange of seismic data. Indeed the Canadian participants will again be tabling a working paper during the current session of the GSE.

The most recent activity of the GSE was the conduct and evaluation of a large-scale technical test involving 31 states. This work is the object of an extensive report being prepared for the Conference on Disarmament. The test has indicated that a number of technical issues require further consideration by the GSE. Canada strongly supports the continuation of this work. The brochure gives some indication of the value and importance of this work, and the need to continue it.

In this context I should also like to make known to the Conference on Disarmament that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced on February 7 that the Government of Canada has agreed to provide \$3.2 million during the period 1986-1989 to upgrade the Canadian Yellowknife seismic array as a major Canadian contribution to monitoring an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban. Yellowknife is recognized as a unique and sensitive location to monitor global seismic events including underground nuclear tests. Updating and modernization of the Yellowknife seismic array, which consists of a series of short-period and long-period seismometers, will enable Canada to contribute to an international system which would constitute an essential monitoring element of a negotiated CTB, utilizing the best technology available. Canada will be using the Yellowknife development to assist the GSE in coming to standards and specifications of seismograph stations that will contribute to seismic verification of a CTB.

We are attempting to show by action rather than rhetoric that we mean what we say on verification — and regard it not as an obstacle, but as part of the solution.

We hope that an analysis of the three papers I have referred to – each of which differs considerably from the others – will provide concrete evidence of some of the possibilities of making progress in the conference, whatever the stage of our deliberations or of our negotiations.

It is our hope that delegations could usefully take the opportunity to review the documents which we and others have submitted. However, we continue to strongly support our collective continuing efforts to reach agreement on the mandates for outer space and a nuclear test ban. . . .



Déclarations et Discours

No. 86/4



SUR LA VOIE D'UNE PLUS GRANDE SÉCURITÉ MONDIALE

Déclaration prononcée par M. J. Alan Beesley, ambassadeur du Canada auprès de la Conférence du désarmement, à cette Conférence, Genève, le 11 mars 1986.

Monsieur le Président, j'aimerais faire aujourd'hui quelques brèves remarques sur trois des principaux points inscrits à l'ordre du jour :

Point 4 : Armes chimiques;

Point 5 : Prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique; et

Point 1 : Interdiction des essais nucléaires

On se souviendra que j'ai fait part de la position du Canada sur les nombreux aspects de chacune de ces questions dans ma déclaration du 4 février 1986 en séance plénière. Aujourd'hui, j'aimerais traiter des mesures concrètes que la Conférence du désarmement pourrait et, selon nous, devrait prendre sur chacun de ces points, en tenant compte du fait que les travaux d'étude, les délibérations et les négociations de la Conférence n'en sont pas au même stade pour chacune des questions.

Point 4 : Armes chimiques

Il est évident que la Conférence est plus avancée dans ses travaux concernant un accord général sur les armes chimiques que sur tout autre point à l'ordre du jour. À cet égard, il est encourageant, mais non surprenant toutefois, que les délégués à la Conférence, à l'issue de leur dernière rencontre, aient pu s'entendre sur le rétablissement du Comité spécial sur les armes chimiques. Néanmoins, il n'y a pas lieu pour nous d'en tirer une satisfaction particulière. Lorsque nous avons ouvert cette session il y a plus d'un mois, les attentes se faisaient plus précises quant aux perspectives de progrès dans ces négociations. De récents rapports sur de nouveaux cas d'utilisation d'armes chimiques, qui ont conduit le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies à instituer une enquête, devraient avoir renforcé notre conviction que des progrès doivent être faits sans plus attendre.

Dans ma déclaration du 4 février, j'ai fait part de l'intention du Canada de soumettre des documents susceptibles de faire progresser les négociations concernant un traité global sur les armes chimiques. Je puis maintenant informer les membres de la Conférence que le Canada a remis aujourd'hui au secrétariat, afin qu'il soit distribué aux délégations, un document intitulé *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*. Comme je l'ai mentionné précédemment, ce document de travail définit quels sont les procédures, le matériel et les normes applicables pour que les conclusions d'une enquête sur les cas signalés d'utilisation d'armes chimiques soient aussi complètes, convaincantes et impartiales que possible. Il s'appuie sur l'expérience et les connaissances canadiennes, mais fait également mention des contributions importantes apportées par plusieurs autres pays ayant effectué des recherches approfondies dans ce domaine, notamment la Suède, la Norvège et la Finlande.

Tel qu'indiqué dans l'introduction, ce guide sera, d'une part, utile à court terme dans le contexte des

pouvoirs dont dispose actuellement le Secrétaire général en vertu de la résolution 37/98D ou de la Charte des Nations Unies, et, d'autre part, pourrait également être utile ultérieurement dans le contexte d'un système de vérification faisant partie d'une éventuelle convention sur les armes chimiques, qui fait actuellement l'objet de négociations à la Conférence du désarmement. Le document, comme certaines délégations le savent déjà, a été remis au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies à New York.

Il convient de remarquer que ce document ne traite pas des procédures ni des critères à suivre pour déterminer s'il y a lieu d'effectuer une enquête. Cette question reste entièrement liée à l'issue des négociations de la Conférence du désarmement. Cette étude a trait essentiellement à ce que les enquêteurs devraient savoir et faire lorsqu'il est fait appel à eux pour donner suite à une décision d'effectuer une enquête, notamment les procédures qui pourraient être suivies et le matériel qui pourrait être nécessaire.

Un document technique portant sur l'identification des substances chimiques sera également soumis prochainement par la délégation du Canada au groupe de travail intéressé. Ce document propose une méthode permettant d'identifier les substances chimiques à partir des numéros d'enregistrement du Chemical Abstracts Service, ce qui pourrait être d'une très grande utilité pour éviter toute ambiguïté dans le processus d'identification et pour simplifier et uniformiser les données éventuelles qui pourraient être échangées dans le cadre de l'application de la convention, en se servant le plus possible des méthodes informatiques dont disposent maintenant les chercheurs pour compiler les données chimiques.

En outre, comme je l'ai indiqué dans ma précédente déclaration, nous comptons également distribuer un index de tous les documents traitant des produits chimiques parus entre 1983 et 1985, de façon à aider les délégations dans leurs travaux.

À cet égard, je tiens à féliciter la délégation du Pakistan pour le remarquable travail qu'elle a effectué en examinant, dans un récent document de travail qui était le premier à avoir été présenté cette année au Comité spécial sur les armes chimiques, certaines questions essentielles sur lesquelles repose une éventuelle convention sur les armes chimiques. J'ai relevé en particulier dans ce document le principe selon lequel l'utilisation des armes chimiques devrait être considérée comme une violation sérieuse d'une éventuelle convention. Le gouvernement du Canada partage ce point de vue.

Point 5 : Prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique

J'aborde maintenant une question sur laquelle nous ne sommes pas encore aussi avancés dans nos travaux que sur celle des négociations sur les armes chimiques, à savoir la prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique. J'ai déjà fait savoir dans ma déclaration du 4 février que, à notre avis, un accord devrait être conclu rapidement sur le renouvellement du mandat de l'an dernier. Je n'ai pas l'intention de reprendre notre argumentation sur cette question. Je voudrais simplement annoncer que la délégation du Canada a remis au secrétariat, pour distribution à toutes les délégations, un abrégé des documents produits en 1985 à ce sujet par le Canada. Nous considérons que l'étude de ces documents fera apparaître clairement que, d'une part, un travail considérable et utile a déjà été effectué par la Conférence pour résoudre les difficultés soulevées par cette question, mais que, d'autre part, il reste beaucoup à faire pour en étudier les modalités juridiques et repérer les lacunes éventuelles. Les délégations devraient examiner les questions contenues dans cet abrégé. Si certaines d'entre elles

sont en désaccord avec certains aspects des documents de travail canadiens ou britanniques présentés au cours de la dernière session et traitant des modalités juridiques, nous aimerions connaître leur point de vue, de préférence sous la forme de documents de travail. À notre avis, cela ne fait que souligner l'urgence de conclure un accord dans les meilleurs délais sur un renouvellement du mandat afin que nous puissions consacrer tous nos efforts à une analyse concrète et approfondie. Dans l'intervalle, chaque délégation devrait se préparer à ces travaux.

Point 1 : Interdiction des essais nucléaires

La troisième question, et sans doute la plus importante, que je souhaiterais aborder est celle d'une interdiction complète des essais nucléaires. Le grand nombre de déclarations faites au cours des dernières semaines a montré que la plupart des délégations partageaient notre point de vue quant à l'importance de cette question. Toutefois, il n'a pas été possible de créer un organisme auxiliaire qui permettrait d'entreprendre un travail concret, en particulier sur des questions telles que la portée, la vérification et l'application de l'interdiction. Plusieurs documents importants ont été présentés sur les divers aspects d'une interdiction complète des essais nucléaires, mais nous n'avons pas encore pu entamer un débat en profondeur à ce sujet. L'un des aspects les plus importants soulevés dans les déclarations et les documents de travail relativement à cette question concerne la vérification sismique. Il existe à cet égard de nombreux points convergents que les recherches approfondies du groupe d'experts scientifiques ont permis de mettre en évidence au fil des années. Je désire maintenant vous annoncer que la délégation du Canada met aujourd'hui à la disposition des autres délégations une brochure publiée récemment par le ministère canadien des Affaires extérieures sur la vérification sismique. Bien que s'adressant essentiellement au public canadien, ce document est le résultat de recherches intensives, repose entièrement sur l'avis de scientifiques et a pour but de clarifier autant que possible certaines des questions concernant la vérification sismique.

Notre intention, en diffusant cette brochure, est claire. La conclusion d'un traité pour l'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires est un objectif fondamental pour le Canada. Notre pays a joué un rôle déterminant dans le domaine de la vérification, une question cruciale dont la technologie sismique est la clé. Depuis 1976, des scientifiques canadiens ont participé aux travaux du groupe international de sismologues de la Conférence du désarmement, chargé d'étudier les aspects techniques d'un échange international de données sismiques. En outre, les délégués canadiens présenteront un nouveau document de travail au cours de la présente série de séances de travail du groupe.

L'une des toutes dernières activités entreprises par le groupe de sismologues a été la tenue et l'évaluation d'un essai expérimental à grande échelle auquel 31 États ont participé. Ces travaux font l'objet d'un rapport détaillé qui sera présenté à la Conférence du désarmement. L'essai a permis de constater qu'un certain nombre de questions techniques exigeaient des recherches plus approfondies de la part du groupe de sismologues. Le Canada est entièrement favorable à la poursuite de ces travaux. La brochure fournit certaines indications quant à la valeur et à l'importance de ces travaux et à la nécessité de les poursuivre.

À cet égard, je voudrais également informer la Conférence du désarmement que le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, le très honorable Joe Clark, a annoncé le 7 février que le gouvernement du Canada avait décidé de consacrer 3,2 millions de dollars, au cours de la période 1986-1989, à la modernisation

de l'ensemble sismologique de Yellowknife, afin d'être en mesure de jouer un rôle important dans le contrôle d'une éventuelle interdiction complète des essais nucléaires. Le centre de Yellowknife est reconnu comme un emplacement exceptionnellement sensible pour contrôler des activités sismiques générales, notamment des essais nucléaires souterrains. Le réaménagement et la modernisation de cet ensemble sismique équipé d'une série de sismomètres à période courte et à période longue, permettra au Canada de participer à la mise en place d'un système international devant constituer un élément de contrôle essentiel pour l'application d'un traité sur l'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires, et qui ferait appel à la technologie la plus récente. Le Canada se servira du centre de Yellowknife pour aider le groupe de sismologues à établir les normes et les spécifications des stations sismographiques qui procéderont à la vérification sismique d'une interdiction complète des essais nucléaires.

Notre intention est de montrer par des gestes concrets plutôt que par des paroles toute l'importance que nous attachons à la vérification, dans laquelle nous voyons, non pas un obstacle, mais un élément de solution.

Nous espérons que l'étude des trois documents dont j'ai fait mention — et qui diffèrent sensiblement l'un de l'autre — fournira une preuve tangible qu'il est possible à la Conférence d'avancer dans ces travaux, à quelque étape que ce soit de nos délibérations ou de nos négociations.

Nous formulons l'espoir que les délégations sauront se prévaloir de l'occasion qui leur est offerte d'examiner les documents qui leur sont présentés. Toutefois, nous restons déterminés à appuyer tous les efforts de la Conférence pour parvenir à une entente sur l'application d'une convention relative à la prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique et d'un traité sur l'interdiction des essais nucléaires [...]

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR J. ALAN BEESLEY
BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
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ITEM 1: nuclear test ban.

It will be recalled that I presented the Canadian position on substantive aspects of each of these items in my Plenary statement of February 4, 1986. Today I wish to address the kind of concrete action which the Conference on Disarmament could, and in our view should, take on each of these items, taking into account that on each subject

the Conference is at a different stage of consideration, deliberation or negotiation.

ITEM 4: CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

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ITEM 5: PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

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aspects of the Canadian or British working papers on the legal regime tabled during our last session, then let us hear from them, preferably in the form of working papers. This only underlines the importance as we see it of earliest possible agreement on a renewed mandate so that we can devote our full efforts to concrete, substantive work. In the meantime, all of us should be preparing for such work.

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It is our hope that delegations could usefully take the opportunity to review the documents which we and others have submitted. However, we continue to strongly support our collective continuing efforts to reach agreement on the mandates for outer space and a nuclear test ban, and would be very troubled if our efforts were unsuccessful in either case. Indeed, effective use of the Canadian papers and those tabled by other delegations can only be made if subsidiary bodies are established to study and discuss them. We suggest also that it would be useful if delegations who have not yet submitted working documents but have the capacity to produce such papers were to give consideration to so doing.