

PROPOSED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BEESLEY

TO ENMOD REVIEW CONFERENCE - 10 SEPTEMBER 1984

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AS A PRELIMINARY TO THE FORMAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH ARE TO TAKE PLACE HERE OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OF ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT BEFORE THIS CONFERENCE THE PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION. WE ARE PLEASED, OF COURSE, THAT IN ADDITION TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, EACH OF WHICH WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE FORMULATION OF THIS CONVENTION IN THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, SOME 63 COUNTRIES, REPRESENTING A CROSS-SECTION OF WESTERN, EASTERN AND NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL STATES HAVE SIGNED THE TREATY AND 43 HAVE RATIFIED IT.

ON MAY 18, 1977 WHEN THE CONVENTION WAS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE, KURT WALDHEIM, REMARKED THAT THE CONVENTION WAS THE FIRST MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT TO DESIGNATE THE

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS DEPOSITARY AND ASSIGNED TO HIM A SPECIFIC ROLE IN THE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. HE INTERPRETED THIS AS INDICATING THE INTENT OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO HAVE THE UNITED NATIONS PLAY A MORE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT. WE MIGHT WELL COME TO THIS THEME IN SUCCEEDING DAYS AS WE EVALUATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE. IN HIS SPEECH, MR. WALDHEIM SPOKE OF A PACKAGE OF TREATIES OF WHICH ENMOD WAS ONE, WHICH HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED MULTILATERALLY. HE INCLUDED THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY IN THIS BODY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, BY WHICH GOVERNMENTS, WITH ALL THEIR DIFFERENCES AND DIVISIONS ACHIEVED PROGRESS LITTLE BY LITTLE. IT WILL BE USEFUL, THEREFORE, AS WE ASSESS THIS CONVENTION TO RECOGNIZE ITS CONTRIBUTION, SMALL THOUGH IT MIGHT BE AS AN INCREMENTAL CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

THERE ARE SOME WHO HAVE CRITICIZED ENMOD AS A TREATY BANNING SYSTEMS WHICH DO NOT EXIST. THIS CRITICISM WILL BE FAMILIAR TO THOSE WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE NEGOTIATION OF A RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TREATY. BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE WORLD DOES NOT STAND STILL. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVANCES IN UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY

POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE, CONCEPTUALLY AND OCCASIONALLY IN SOME DETAIL, HOW ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES MIGHT BE APPLIED TO MILITARY ENDS.

THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR MILITARY OR OTHER HOSTILE PURPOSES IS OBVIOUSLY INFLUENCED BY THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENVIRONMENT. OUR ENVIRONMENT IS NOT ONLY GLOBAL IN SCOPE, BUT IS HIGHLY COMPLEX IN STRUCTURE AND HAS MANY DISCONTINUITIES. THE ENERGIES THAT MIGHT BE TAPPED FROM THE ENVIRONMENT COULD BE ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE GREATER THAN THAT AVAILABLE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. STRUCTURAL DISCONTINUITIES IN THE ENVIRONMENT OFTEN REPRESENT SITUATIONS OF DISEQUILIBRIUM INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT ENERGY IMBALANCE. WHILE ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS OVER WHICH MAN HAS EXERCISED NO CONTROL CAN IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES CONFER EXPLOITABLE MILITARY ADVANTAGE, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE, WITH APPROPRIATE TECHNIQUES, TO HARNESS, DIRECT OR MODIFY ENVIRONMENTAL ENERGY IMBALANCE TO GAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGE. MAJOR MODIFICATIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENT MAY BE MORE EASILY ACHIEVABLE IN SITUATIONS OF INSTABILITY THAN IN SITUATIONS OF NEAR EQUILIBRIUM. THE LARGER THE VOLUME TO BE AFFECTED, THE GREATER WOULD BE THE TOTAL ENERGY NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED CHANGE.

WHAT THIS CONVENTION WAS MEANT TO ACCOMPLISH WAS THE FORECLOSURE OF THIS AVENUE OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.

THOUGH THE CONVENTION IS LIMITED IN SCOPE, IT SERVES AS A USEFUL ADDITION TO THE EXISTING MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL INSTRUMENTS. WHILE NO COUNTRY IS ABLE TO PRODUCE THE PHENOMENA THE USE OF WHICH THE CONVENTION SEEKS TO PROHIBIT, THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE MILITARY USE. THE CONVENTION CAN HELP PRE-EMPT NEW MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE THEY ARE UNDER WAY AND THEREBY MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

I BELIEVE IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT IT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED THAT THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN RESPECTED. THIS IS ANOTHER ASPECT WE SHOULD ADDRESS. AS WE INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE THE COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TO BE ESSENTIAL - PERHAPS THE MOST ESSENTIAL ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS - IT IS USEFUL TO UNDERTAKE A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE UTILITY OF THESE PROVISIONS IN EXISTING TREATIES.

I TRUST THAT DURING THESE TWO WEEKS IT WILL BE POSSIBLE AS WE UNDERSTAND THE APPLICATION OF TREATY PROVISIONS, TO GAIN AN APPRECIATION OF THE LESSONS WE HAVE LEARNED AND APPLY THAT KNOWLEDGE TO CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. I REFER TO WHAT I SEE AS A MIRROR IMAGE BETWEEN THIS CONVENTION AND OUR EFFORTS IN THE CD TO FIND AN AGREEMENT ON THE BANNING OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. ON THIS POINT I SHALL SAY NO MORE.

FINALLY, I BELIEVE WE MUST DETERMINE A MEANS OF ENCOURAGING (CONVINCING) OTHER NATIONS WHO HAVE NOT SIGNED THE TREATY THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST INDIVIDUALLY, AND OURS

COLLECTIVELY, TO DO SO. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MECHANISMS WHICH MIGHT BE EMPLOYED AS WE PREPARE TO PARTICIPATE IN UNGA 39. I HOPE THAT WE CAN FIND THE MEANS TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE.