

CANADIAN CENTRE FOR ARMS
CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

PLACE	OTTAWA	ENDROIT
DATE	November 1, 1985.	DATE
VOLUME	II	VOLUME

OFFICIAL REPORTERS
Angus, Stonehouse & Co. Ltd.,
251 Bank Street, Suite 705,
Ottawa, Ontario. K2P 1X3
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CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON DISARMAMENT AND ARMS
CONTROL AFFAIRS

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CANADA AND THE MULTILATERAL FORUMS

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Held at the Lester B. Pearson
Building, Main Conference Room,
Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario,
on Friday, November 1, 1985, at
the hour of 9:15 a.m.

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1 -- Upon commencing:

2 CHAIRPERSON DIANE DE MILLE: Good
3 morning. I would like to call this session to order.
4 This morning's session is called the Conference on
5 Disarmament. My name is Diane De Mille. I am formerly
6 the Director of the Peace Education Network in
7 Vancouver, B. C., and I am now Editor/Writer for the
8 Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

9 Just a few words about this morning's
10 session. Translation equipment is at the door, and
11 there is a verbatim being taken by the secretarial
12 staff in the centre of the room.

13 I would ask that you identify your-
14 self before making comments or asking questions.

15 The introductory overview this
16 morning is being given by Mr. John Beesley. He
17 has made a major contribution to the development of
18 Law of the Sea. From 1980 to 1982 he was Ambassador
19 to the Law of the Sea Conference in New York.
20 Currently he is Ambassador and Permanent Representative
21 to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva, with
22 concurrent accreditation to the GATT Commission, and
23 Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament.

24 Just a note: the three speakers that
25 were held over from yesterday's session will be the
26 first on the speakers list when we open our general
27 discussion.
28

29 Ambassador Beesley.

30 AMBASSADOR J. ALAN BEESLEY: Thank



1 Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

2 you again. Can you hear me because I am sometimes known
3 for not speaking loudly enough. Don't hesitate to
4 raise your hands if I fade away.

5 You can call me Alan, incidentally.

6 To avoid any difficulties over which
7 item I begin with, and thereby raise questions of
8 priorities, I will just mention to you what many of
9 you are very familiar with.

10 The Report of the Conference on
11 Disarmament to the General Assembly -- it is entitled:
12 Official Records: Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27,
13 Document A/40/27. It sounds like we are right in the
14 C.D. when I talk like that! You will be pleased to know
15 I am not going to read the whole thing to you. But
16 obviously, anyone who has not had access to that
17 document should get it because it is a mine of informa-
18 tion. In addition, it contains a lot of typically U.N.
19 style drafting of some delegations saying this, and
20 some delegations saying that. But the facts are none-
21 theless there, buried in with the verbiage.

22 I say that because it is a heavy
23 piece of work, but so is the mandate of the Conference
24 on Disarmament.

25
26 I am going to read aloud to you the
27 Agenda, and then begin by discussing individual items.
28 The Agenda includes: a Nuclear Test Ban; Cessation
29 of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament;
30 Prevention of Nuclear War, Including all Related



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 Matters; Chemical Weapons; Prevention of an Arms Race
3 in Outer Space; Effective International Arrangements to
4 Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or
5 Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons; New Types of Weapons
6 of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons;
7 Radiological Weapons; Comprehensive Programme of Dis-
8 armament; Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with
9 the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and
10 Other Relevant Measures; and, finally the part that
11 takes nearly a month usually every year, Consideration
12 and Adoption of the Annual Report of the Conference and
13 any other Report as appropriate to the General Assembly
14 of the United Nations.

15 As you can see, that is a pretty tall
16 order for any conference to get through. So to some
17 degree we are all going to have to be somewhat selective
18 and I certainly have no objection to that if anyone
19 wishes to speak to particular issues rather than on
20 everything, because it is just impossible in the time
21 available to discuss every one of these items in any
22 depth.

23
24 If and when we want to focus on
25 procedure, I will refer you to one of my favourite
26 authors who has written something containing a lot
27 of criticism on procedure, so I will leave that until
28 we get to it.

I would like to try and give you an



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 the results of the 1985 Session. We will all recall
3 that it began in an atmosphere of some hope, bordering
4 on expectation in the case of some generated by the
5 resumption of the U.S.S.R./U.S.A. bilateral arms control
6 discussion, which many felt would give new life to the
7 Conference on Disarmament. Many hoped that.

8 There was some reason for that
9 optimism, but as a generality, one would find it
10 difficult to document in terms of results across the
11 board. Where we achieved some progress, it was hard
12 to relate it directly to the change in atmosphere,
13 the change in attitude, because it did not bring with
14 it fundamental changes on the part of either of the two
15 major powers.

16 We will deal with the issues one by
17 one, but the initial atmosphere of optimism was not
18 borne out as a whole. There were some individual cases.

19 I think the most important achieve-
20 ment, and this is my personal view, was agreement
21 reached on the mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on the
22 Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We had been
23 working for years just on getting agreement on a mandate
24 to enable us to establish an ad hoc committee. The
25 Conference has recently been rechristened the Conference
26 on Disarmament, no longer the Committee on Disarmament.
27 So, we no longer have working groups. We think we have
28 ad hoc committees.
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 in the eyes of some, because it was not a negotiating
3 mandate. Nonetheless, it was a mandate and it did enable
4 us to do some useful work, as I will explain a little
5 later.

6 Where we had been making the most
7 progress, on the question of chemical weapons, we did
8 not get very far, but we nonetheless registered some
9 concrete steps. In one case, it was a Canadian formula-
10 tion, as it happened, but we reached agreement on a
11 short formula for the prohibition of use which had been
12 one of the issues bedeviling the Conference. But when
13 it came time to flesh out the other inter-related parts
14 of the draft convention to insure that that short
15 formulation was adequate, we ran into a host of diffi-
16 culties. Nonetheless, some progress was reached.

17 If I could editorialize for a moment,
18 the year of greatest progress, I think, was the year
19 when my predecessor, Don McPhail had chaired the ad hoc
20 committee, the Chemical Weapons Working Group as it then
21 was, and that was two years ago. My role initially was
22 as "friend of the Chair", to try and work out something
23 on that short formulation.

24 So we did get somewhere on an issue
25 that is really of increasing importance when one thinks
26 of the consequences of the continuing, and I say continu-
27 ing proliferation of chemical weapons.

28 We also made progress on some technical
29 issues relating to the relationship of the chemical
30



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In sum,
3 what the issue was all about was how to ensure that any-
4 thing we are able to agree upon does not erode the
5 status or the effect of the actual provisions of the
6 1925 Protocol, but moreover if the Convention that we
7 hope to agree upon is denounced by anyone, we want to
8 ensure that the pre-existing Convention, which is not,
9 of course as comprehensive, would still be binding on
10 any parties. It sounds like a technical point, but it
11 has been a very difficult one to resolve. I think we
12 have resolved that now.

13 We did some useful work on radio-
14 logical weapons, but again, partly because it is
15 not an overwhelming issue for the great powers.
16 There, as I will explain in a moment, we ran into
17 difficulties of another order, but it is worth noting
18 that the two major powers, and I think this would apply
19 also to the other great powers, so-called permanent
20 members of the Security Council, are ready tomorrow
21 to sign an agreement going back to the 1979 text
22 outlawing this new and undeveloped class of weapons,
23 radiological weapons. It is something I will come back
24 to, because it is not happening. There are reasons for
25 it which I will explain.
26

27 We also managed to work out some new
28 language, hardly something one could call a breakthrough,
29 on the comprehensive program of disarmament, one of the
30 issues that has been on the Agenda for a while. It looks



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 as if we may be able to produce a final draft on the
3 comprehensive program of disarmament for the next
4 session of the General Assembly. It now looks that way,
5 but it cannot be taken for granted.

6 Those elements of progress, which are
7 not insignificant in any case because we are dealing
8 with 40 states, not merely two which can agree upon
9 something and then put a multilateral umbrella over it
10 as has been possible in the past. It is a representa-
11 tive groups of states. Broadly speaking there are
12 the three groups: the Western, Socialist (Eastern
13 European) and the neutral and non-aligned, plus China.

14 There are a variety of views within
15 every group, except one. We don't find very much
16 diversity within the Eastern European group. But the
17 difficulties are of the kind you could imagine, because
18 they can be very genuine differences of views on how to
19 approach any one of these questions. So, when we make
20 progress it is meaningful, even if it is minor or not
21 as much as we would like.

22 Now, what are the negative aspects?
23 Where did we not do as well as we wanted. We had very
24 little, if any, progress on the nuclear issues. The
25 major issues after all that preoccupy all of us are:-
26 Nuclear Test Ban: I cannot say that we really made much
27 progress, certainly nothing approaching what we did
28 on these other issues. Prevention of Nuclear War: it is
29 a kind of continuing debate, but it is a serious one. If
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 anything we got into more polemics than we might have
3 expected, and not just East/West polemics, but between
4 members of the neutral non-aligned group and the West,
5 particularly India, because for the non-aligned some
6 of the Western positions are under attack. Verification:
7 it is almost a dirty word for some of these delegations.
8 The word deterrence is almost enough to create a right
9 of reply, and so there are some highly emotional
10 reactions to position on all sides that, in this case,
11 are sometimes between neutral and non-aligned and
12 Western delegations.

13
14 Nonetheless, we did go some distance
15 in working out the basis for approaching these problems.

16 What we agreed upon is pretty
17 obvious. If we could establish a mechanism, including
18 the Plenary as a whole, we would not preclude any state-
19 ment by any delegation on any issue deemed relevant to
20 the prevention of nuclear war. That may seem very
21 obvious and self-evident, and so it is, but we had to
22 negotiate even to reach that agreement, because that
23 meant that some of the no no's, some of the controversial
24 concepts espoused by some delegations, some states, some
25 alliances, nonetheless were permissible as part of the
26 debate.

27 I think we did come close to agreeing
28 on an organizational framework, and the U.S. and the
29 U.K. -- some others had had reservations about even
30 doing that. So, there was some movement there; not



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 obviously of the kind most of us would have hoped for.

3 Now, I can say something very contro-
4 versial. I think one could make a case for the pro-
5 position that the lack of progress cannot be ascribed
6 to any particular factor or any specific delegation or
7 group. In some cases it came from one source, in some
8 cases from another. But I would say that if there were
9 shared credit for the progress we did make, they^{we} shared
10 responsibility for where we did not make progress.
11 This is something I will come back to. One of the
12 reasons is our own process ^{of} procedure in the Confer-
13 ence on Disarmament. We regularly become mired in
14 endless procedural discussion, wasting time and energy
15 and money that could be better spent on substantive
16 issues and negotiations. I won't dwell on this, but
17 you should know that the Canadian delegation is in the
18 forefront of those trying to ~~get~~ cut away some of the
19 procedural undergrowth and enable the Conference to
20 focus more directly, explicitly and effectively upon
21 substance.

22
23 There is a large measure of support
24 for that, as a general proposition, depending on the
25 issue. There are one or two or more delegations which
26 don't want to touch a particular rule of procedure
27 because it protects their position.

28 Consensus is the major operating
29 principle, and it is pointless to develop and try and
30 make agreement on a major arms control agreement by any



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 other means if the consensus does not bring on board
3 the major powers.

4 Increasingly consensus becomes a kind
5 of basis for obstructing progress. One delegation from
6 any group can prevent the establishment of the agreement
7 on a mandate, and then even if we agree on the mandate,
8 can prevent the establishment of a working group. It
9 sounds incredible. It is. But, it's true. And that
10 is part of the problem we face, that even where we
11 sense a general will to do something, there is no
12 automaticity because of our own procedures as well as
13 because of the variety of views on almost every subject.

14 It is a very difficult process. It
15 is frustrating. It is a painful edging along towards
16 agreement. But gradually, and I can say one thing, I
17 think there is a greater awareness each month, each
18 year now, because it has been seven years since an
19 agreement was reached in the C.D., that if we don't
20 start focusing on common ground, trying to detect it,
21 delineate it, and then expand it, we really are in
22 danger, I think, of turning the whole process into
23 such a laughing stock that it won't be tolerated, it
24 won't continue.

25
26 I don't want to make it sound as if
27 it is all down-side. It is not. But we do have to do
28 something about our procedures, and I think there now
29 is a willingness to look at these questions.

30 Turning to specific subjects, Nuclear



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 Test Ban: Well, we did not manage to reach consensus
3 on the establishment of a subsidiary body on this item.
4 This does not mean that there was not a lot of discussion;
5 sometimes not merely monologue, sometimes a real dialogue,
6 but nonetheless if you don't set up a working group it is
7 very hard to start negotiating on actual tests.

8 There was a very tough position on
9 the part of some of our Western allies on any question
10 of adopting a negotiating mandate. This drew attacks
11 from various quarters, particularly from the group we
12 call the G-21, the neutral and non-aligned, and we can
13 come back to that, including the reasons for it.

14 As a consequence, the Western Group
15 did not accept some of the very wide-ranging proposals
16 from either the Group of 21 or the Socialist Group.
17 There were times when it looked as if we might be able
18 to reach agreement, but we did not.

19 This is the case where some members
20 of the neutral and non-aligned group, one very famous
21 person in particular, takes a stand as a matter
22 of principle. No one can deny that there is a
23 principle at stake, but sometimes one delegation, such
24 as this one, can bring the whole Conference to a halt.
25 It makes a point, but it does not usually make progress.
26 That is another problem we have to deal with. It is
27 almost one, sometimes, of personalities.
28

29 This is not a very encouraging
30 picture to present to a group like this which is



1 Ambassador J. Alan Beesley
2 committed to arms control, disarmament and the develop-
3 ment of a more peaceful world, but it is the facts of
4 life. We do what we can to try and cut through the
5 procedural underbrush.

6 The Western mandate was one that
7 could have enabled some progress to be made, I have
8 no doubt about that, even if it was not an ideal man-
9 date from the Canadian point of view, but we did not
10 get agreement on it. It does not mean we have dropped
11 our efforts. It does not mean we won't go back to it.
12 But the problem is usually a recurring one: whether
13 the best is the enemy of the good. It is a continuing
14 issue. Whether we reach agreement on the best possible
15 mandate enabling immediate and active negotiations or
16 whether we start with something more modest in the hopes
17 it will produce momentum, and develop common ground
18 that can lead to something better.

19 There were developments, nonetheless,
20 which I will come to, of a technical nature which are
21 not incidental; they are quite important.

22 The ad hoc group of seismic experts
23 is the group that focuses on the supposedly technical
24 but increasingly highly political aspects of verifi-
25 ability of a test ban.

26 Let me say something that may be
27 deemed controversial, but if one can sum up the results
28 of the Western consultation, it would probably be to
29 the effect that we have reached the stage now where
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 nuclear weapons tests of the order we would like to
3 reduce them to are detectable. But it is not clear
4 and there are strongly held differences of views on
5 whether one can identify events and determine with
6 certainty that they are a nuclear explosion or some
7 other kind of event. Nonetheless, that is quite a
8 long way from where we were a little while ago when some
9 people were questioning verifiability at all. On the
10 other hand, it is a big step backwards from where we
11 were a few years ago when we thought we were on the
12 verge of a trilateral agreement.

13
14 But there is a real issue here. Some
15 of the experts present are in a better position to
16 address it than I am because my job is to know as much
17 as possible about the technical aspects, but I have
18 long since learned that I don't know everything about
19 anything. So I rely on our technical experts, and, of
20 course, on an issue that like, those with the most
21 knowledge are not necessarily the countries like Canada.
22 Not having a nuclear weapons program, we have a pretty
23 good basis for making judgments, and I think we can
24 come back to that.

25
26 Nonetheless, our objective, which we
27 continue not merely to reiterate but work towards, is
28 to begin negotiations on a nuclear test ban as soon as
29 possible. To this end we have eventually advocated
30 a step by step approach, not merely in the sense of
procedural development, trying to focus more on whether



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 the seismic experts can reach a stage where we can get
3 agreement on what is detectable and what is identifiable,
4 but in another sense a step by step approach which I do
5 not think is official government policy yet. But we are
6 considering the possibility and we have made statements
7 in the past that have gone some way towards such a
8 possibility. It is an approach something analogous to or
9 similar to what is called the Japanese ratchet approach.
10 Now I am speaking to you very frankly, and I am not
11 speaking officially for the moment and saying this is
12 government policy, but one of the questions being
13 considered, and one worth discussion undoubtedly, is
14 whether a process can be agreed upon whereby a gradual
15 and inevitable lowering of the threshold could be
16 agreed upon that would eventually lower the threshold
17 to either tolerable limits or none at all.

18
19 There are some like the Australians
20 who don't want to hear about such an approach because
21 they feel it is too important; it is all or nothing
22 at all. There are some like the Swedes who would say:
23 "well, actually we are tougher than the Australians," if
24 anyone can be, although we are considered among the
25 toughest ourselves. But the Swedes would say they could
26 live with that if there were a final cut-off date
27 somewhere down the line. A nuclear power would
28 know that they could go on testing; they could plan
29 their testing program, but they would know that
30 eventually it would reach lower and lower limits and



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 eventually perhaps it would have to stop. I say "perhaps"
3 because it would be a difficult task selling that one.
4 It is only a gleam in the eye of some delegates, and
5 it is still very very controversial. I mention it as
6 an illustration of one of the approaches actively
7 being considered, but it is not the Canadian govern-
8 mental approach. Of course, for many people it would
9 be felt that this was a give-away because it is not
10 what we truly want, which is the cessation of nuclear
11 testing. Again, it is the art of the possible, but
12 it is the kind of issue that is worth discussing, if
13 not in this group today, on some other occasion I think.

14 We are getting closer on a totally
15 separate issue, but one that someone mentioned yester-
16 day, and I have already touched on; prevention of
17 nuclear war. We are reaching the stage -- as I say,
18 it is almost embarrassing to point to this as progress --
19 of an organizational framework, where we could actually
20 begin negotiation. It is not true to say that there
21 are no negotiations going on in the absence of a working
22 group because the dialogue itself is not merely the
23 preliminary phase of negotiation, it is the central part
24 of the negotiating process because it consists of
25 feeling one another out and trying to determine where
26 the areas of possible progress exist, and where there
27 are not any, what kind of imaginative approach might
28 lay the groundwork.

29
30 In spite of the polemics I mentioned,



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 we continued to move slightly closer together on a basis
3 for approaching that very inherently difficult problem.
4 We have not yet done it, but we may be in a position to
5 see something at the next Session.

6 Unfortunately, the various proposals
7 by various groups did not meet with other acceptance.

8 We really would like to see any
9 framework whatsoever, including an agreement to set
10 aside specified meetings of Plenary which would act
11 as the negotiating body. We would settle for any
12 kind of procedural framework that would enable us to
13 address that issue in a more structured fashion, a
14 more systematic fashion than what we have been able
15 to achieve to date. I cannot make any predictions,
16 but we are not going to give up on it.

17 A lot of Western delegations as well
18 as non-aligned delegations attach importance to this.
19 And the U.S.S.R. consistently supports negotiations on
20 that subject. This does not mean they see their
21 position in the same way we do, but at least it means
22 there are possibilities.

23 I would like to turn to chemical
24 weapons. I don't defend my order of priority, but
25 on chemical weapons there is at one and the same time
26 an area for the greatest potential. Perhaps in
27 spite of our worries about nuclear weaponry, the horrors
28 of the use of chemical weapons is such that this, at
29 least, is urgent, in my opinion. The consequences of
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 their use are so horrific that it ought to be an area
3 where you would just expect wide-spread pressure from
4 all around the world. It just is not there. It is
5 not there. Nonetheless, we are not waiting for the
6 public pressure from that one. I have already mentioned
7 that Canada has been in the forefront, but we are not
8 alone. There is quite a wide-spread feeling of the
9 need to press ahead with this.

10 We were probably the first to really
11 emphasize, again and again, that what we are talking
12 about is a non-proliferation treaty. It is not a
13 bilateral negotiation where the rest of us can make
14 helpful input. We made it very clear that this is
15 another global problem that concerns everyone, and
16 that now it looks as if the genie is out of the bottle.
17 I won't talk to you about the disagreements that occur
18 amongst Canadian scientists, and some scientists from
19 other countries, on where and when chemical weapons
20 may have been used in Southeast Asia, or in Afghanistan.
21 But in the Gulf War, I don't think anyone doubts that
22 they have been used. The worst of it is that we don't
23 find a wide-spread emotional condemnation by other
24 developing countries, for example, of their use. The
25 inhibitions vary with the delegation. There is a
26 tendency to assume somehow that it would give offence
27 to Arabs as a whole to opt into that. But I remember
28 one particularly moving address by the Foreign Minister
29 of Iran, and it was my turn to host what I always
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 wanted to call the -- well, I won't tell you what I
3 wanted to call it -- group that would meet very
4 informally of the heads of Western delegations. We
5 settled for a name called the Black Label Group. But,
6 in any event, it was my turn to chair the group. I just
7 said that, personally, I felt that we were all collect-
8 ively guilty of a total lack of courage if we did not
9 address this issue differently and more vigorously
10 than we had. What I discovered was that everyone at
11 the meeting had come with the same view intending to
12 say the same thing.

13 We have done it. We have made a
14 big issue, for example, of the anniversary of the
15 1925 Protocol, which sounds like a trivial thing but
16 it was not the way it was presented. We used this
17 kind of thing as a reason for trying to develop more
18 pressure, more momentum. One of the problems, and it
19 depends on your optic, the point of view -- we had
20 quite an interesting discussion amongst officials the
21 other day, although we did not find total agreement.
22 When you disagree with one another, sometimes you may
23 not be aware that you are a mirror image of discussions
24 amongst officials because there is no monolithic
25 approach in any of these things, at least not in any
26 meetings I attend. But in this case the problem is
27 that the U.S.A. is in the forefront. Why is that a
28 problem? Because the Russians won't accept our approach,
29 and some of our Western allies don't like it too much,
30



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 and some of the non-aligned are not saying. The U.S.A.
3 had made a major proposal, a very forthcoming proposal,
4 involving very intrusive inspection, verification.
5 Now immediately, of course, some say: Ahaha! It's a
6 trick. They know it will never be accepted and this way
7 they can get credit for the proposal and never have to
8 deliver.

9
10 Who can make a judgment on that? I
11 have been assured repeatedly by all of the many voices
12 with which the U.S. speaks on most of these issues, that
13 this one was put through the meat grinder at all levels,
14 inter-agency consultation, and the U.S. has put its name
15 behind this treaty. They are willing to accept the
16 famous Article X, which is a very strict and intrusive
17 verification procedure.

18 This is not the kind of thing,
19 obviously, I would want to be said publicly outside
20 the room, but some of our closest friends and allies --
21 the French don't like this, the Dutch are not altogether
22 happy with it, nor the Germans, nor the Japanese.
23 Basically it is a problem of worry about national
24 security, and accepting people who can come in almost
25 anywhere to look at anything that looks like a chemical
26 factory for pesticides or something else, coupled with
27 the desire to protect the domestic industries.

28 This is a case -- and I don't think
29 anyone is going to wave any flags over this -- where
30 Canada did the necessary study. We were the first, and



1 Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

2 I am not sure if we are still the only, I think we may
3 be, to say we could accept the U.S. Article X for
4 ourselves. But we checked it out with industry, and
5 did not find the kinds of problems that others were
6 alleging. We also checked it out with constitutional
7 experts and found that it would not break up Canada
8 over constitutional issues. So, we remain committed
9 to this very strict verification approach.

10 But the U.S.A. itself has repeatedly
11 said that they are not wedded to it, it is not a pre-
12 condition for a treaty. If others would propose
13 alternatives, they would be willing to look at them
14 and discuss them. But alternatives are not being put
15 forward.

16 This is a case of the situation
17 people commonly think about, in reverse, where the
18 U.S.S.R. is hiding behind the American proposal and
19 simply attacking various aspects of the the American
20 position, and now of course attacking the binary
21 weapons desired program. But the U.S.S.R. itself has
22 made some moves which we were the first delegation to
23 welcome.

24 One thing I have not been fired for
25 is speaking extemporaneously. When they made a proposal
26 it happened that I was on the speakers list, so I
27 welcomed this particular proposal. I was able to run
28 around and see if anybody in the Western group would
29 be too upset if I did it.
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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Anyway, I did it. Certainly in Ottawa I was backed up because they did make an interesting proposal on the destruction of stocks, which would be verified, which is an essential element in the process.

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But, who do you blame? Do you blame the U.S.S.R. for not being responsive in the legal sense to the U.S. treaty, because they have not been. Do you blame some of the Western allies for not supporting the U.S.A., or do you blame everybody for saying: "Obviously this is not going to wash. It is too strict. It is too intrusive. Let's try and work out an alternative formulation."

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Bear in mind that if you think Cruise Missiles are difficult to verify if you have an agreement, try and verify a chemical weapons convention, a comprehensive one involving total destruction.

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This is another case where people who don't have the weaponry, and don't have it as a matter of principle, might be willing to accept very sweeping verification measures, but some of those who don't have it still feel they cannot accept the kind of intrusive inspection demanded by the U.S.A. treaty.

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But, to date, some of my colleagues would say the blame is on the Russians. Some might say -- I have not heard any say -- that maybe the blame is on the U.S.A. for not coming up with another proposal. But, in this kind of situation, why should



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 they. When they have put in a proposal, and have
3 said they mean it, and they will accept all the
4 intrusiveness, nobody has come up with another
5 approach. Should Canada? It is a question to
6 consider. We have, after all, shown more than our
7 good faith by doing the studies necessary to imple-
8 ment this very treaty provision. We have not said:
9 "It has got to be this, or nothing." But on this
10 issue, as on some others, what one has to think about
11 is what would be the risk? If one thinks that
12 chemical weapons are useful, it is almost a contra-
13 diction in terms. But what would be the risk of
14 giving up the chemical weapons option to those who
15 think it necessary?

16 I have been subjected to some
17 terrifying briefings, not just on the consequences
18 of the use of chemical weapons, but the consequences
19 of an attack in Europe utilizing chemical weapons
20 in a sophisticated and selective manner. They are
21 not just something that would create wide-spread
22 suffering, they are very effective weapons. It is
23 another reason for wiping them out, just wiping them
24 out completely.

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26 But it is another case where it is
27 not easy to be simplistic, and say: "Well, the fault
28 is here, the fault is there." I could probably get
29 any ten delegates, or any ten officials, or any ten
30 representatives of N.G.O.'s around the table and



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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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analyze the situation, and we would come up with a number of different solutions. But we would not be too sure who to blame.

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This is a worrisome thing. I think there are some signs -- not the kind I would want to bet on -- that the U.S.S.R. is getting increasingly concerned about the proliferation issue. What is going to come of that, I don't know. They helped start the proliferation problem.

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The Federal Republic of Germany has a very tough stance on this, on principle, but they are worried about their domestic industries. They want something that would not somehow put them in a position where they would have to wind down their own domestic pesticides industry, etc. It is fairly well known that the technology allegedly used by Iraq allegedly came from the Federal Republic with not the slightest hint of the kind of use to which it was going to be put. Maybe if one looked for analogy, it would be with the Indian peaceful pop, where we supplied the technology.

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The fact remains, the genies are out of the bag, and it is always harder to get them back in.

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I think that is one of the most serious issues facing us. I have spent too long on it, perhaps, but it is worth noting that in spite of all these difficulties, we have made some very significant



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 progress, but at the heart of this, as in any other
3 issue, looms the verification problem.

4 I am going to mention, as an indi-
5 cation of the amount of time and effort we have put
6 into this, that the Ad Hoc Committee has meet only
7 16 times, but the three working groups have met on
8 54 occasions -- all this in the last year -- are
9 there were 59 meetings of drafting and other groups,
10 just on this one issue of the many I have mentioned.
11 It is a case where we devote a lot of time and effort,
12 and we call upon experts. Of all the fields in which
13 I have to operate, the only one where if I really
14 need some expertise I won't be told there is a
15 budgetary problem preventing it, is arms control.
16 This is a very well kept secret, but I don't think
17 you should be unaware of that. There is a willingness
18 to spend money to provide whatever is needed to get
19 on with the job. This is something I will come back
20 to on other space, where I think what Canada is doing
21 is incredible in terms of the amount of money being
22 put into it.

23
24 But, this is a case where when we
25 need experts, we can get them. And we do need them.
26 You can see that that alone would be a pretty full-
27 time job. It is almost the justification for a
28 conference on its own, and some have said so, including,
29 in a very informal way, the Russian Ambassador, and
30 the Yugoslav Ambassador.



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

I won't say more about that.

Radiological weapons: I have already told you that there was a bilateral agreement in 1979 on the basis of which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. could conclude a treaty tomorrow. However, the inhibitions are that the U.S.S.R. is willing, or at least wants to appear willing to consider an issue that is being linked with the banning of radiological weapons, and is considered organically linked by some of the non-aligned and neutral states, but which could be handled separately. If it were, it would enable us to conclude a quick agreement on radiological weapons. Its significance would be more symbolic, perhaps, than practical. Nonetheless, it would show that the C.D. can work.

The difficulty, the question with which it is linked, as I am sure you all know, is the tax on nuclear facilities. This is linked with Iraq/Israeli issues, etc., but more and more of the Western states, the Western delegations, reflect a kind of thoughtful process of evaluation at home that has caused them to conclude, also, that this is a very serious issue, the tax on nuclear facilities. Now, that does not mean it should be addressed in the Conference on Disarmament. There are several other places it could be more appropriately addressed. Indeed, it is even being addressed in the IAEA. Properly speaking, it probably should be handled



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 under the Geneva Protocols on warfare. It is not
3 too likely that it will be when it is already in
4 the C.D., so we have a kind of procedural but also
5 substantive road-block here.

6 We have had very vigorous disagree-
7 ment, you will be pleased to know, between the
8 Delegation and Headquarters here, on whether the
9 U.S.S.R. could be jockeyed into a position where
10 they would sign a treaty tomorrow. Depending on
11 who they are talking to, they always say the right
12 thing. They will say: "Yes, we will sign tomorrow."
13 On the other hand they will say: "Well, of course, it
14 is linked with this other matter." My own belief
15 is that if there were enough public rationale for
16 doing it, they would sign a bilateral. But the U.S.A.
17 cannot initiate the action because their position is
18 controversial: they appear to be rejecting the pre-
19 occupation of the non-aligned as well as the Western
20 countries about a tax on nuclear weapons, so they are
21 playing a relatively low key role. Nevertheless,
22 both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have publicly stated
23 they are willing to sign a treaty outlawing radio-
24 logical weapons at any time. It have not happened.
25 Maybe Canada should open it for signature, and be
26 the first to sign. Ho, ho, ho!

27
28 The fact is we did have a statement
29 in the General Assembly that Canada would be prepared
30 to sign. Maybe some third country, maybe a group of



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 other countries could take it out of the hands of the
3 two great powers. But they would also be taking it
4 out of the hands of the Conference on Disarmament,
5 and therefore, instead of being a kind of shot in the
6 arm to the Conference, it could be an indication that
7 you cannot really trust anything important to this
8 process.

9 So nothing is yet devised to solve
10 that one.

11 I am almost finished.

12 There are also some very firm
13 positions on this. The U.S.A., but France also,
14 absolutely refused to enter into formal negotiations
15 on the prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities.
16 The French will not even be present when this matter
17 is discussed in Committee.

18 The U.S.A. does say that they are
19 prepared to address this issue, certainly in
20 general terms, and perhaps in more specific terms.

21 The good news in with all the bad
22 is that the new Chairman -- incidentally, we were
23 under great pressure to take on the Chairmanship
24 of that, and had a terrible time fending it off, but
25 we had very good reason for now adding that to our
26 burden of duties, including the reason that we were
27 not sure that it was going to go anywhere anyhow for
28 the time being -- but now under Australian Chairman-
29 ship -- he is a very vigorous personality -- he has
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

worked out a basis for working in tandem, both on the radiological weapons issue and on the other issue of the tax on nuclear weapons. So, willy-nilly, progress is being made and it may come to something. I hope so.

Back in 1948, I think it was, we agreed that weapons of mass destruction as such would include nuclear, lethal, chemical, biological and radiological. So it is not a non-issue as it is always treated.

I had better shorten what I am saying, but I think you should know that on this, as on other issues, we put, to use a vulgar expression, our money where our mouth is. We put in a two-volume compendium of Conference on Disarmament verbatim records, and working papers; more to the point, on the radiological weapons question. It may be thought by some to be overkill in terms of the importance of the issue, but the fact remains we felt it was an area where progress could be made and we did not want people spending all their time looking for documents.

It is amazing how a simple procedural move like that, which costs money, can shorten the whole process. Of course that is what we heard from other delegations and from the Secretariat, that this simple move by Canada crystallized the issues, and made the C.D. much more effective in attempting to



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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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focus on these questions.

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So, we did get some beginning of

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progress, mostly on our process.

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What about outer space? One of

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our major objectives now is not to extend the mandate

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into actual negotiations. We would like to do that.

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It is to hold fast the existing mandate, and not

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have it eroded as could occur. It did not provide

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for the initiation of actual negotiation, but it

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called for substantive work to begin that would be

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relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer

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space.

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Agreement on the mandate did reflect

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what you would have to describe as a constructive

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spirit of compromise in spite of all the polemics

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on S.D.I., etc.

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Again, Canada was the first country

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to speak, again because we were on the list, about

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the importance of that particular achievement. But

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we did not speak in order to say rah-rah. We did

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it in order to insure that somebody was saying that

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we don't want this mandate and this Ad Hoc Committee

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to expire at the end of this year, and then go back

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to square one and start negotiating all over again.

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The Mexican Ambassador had just

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spoken and made sure that the mandate ended when

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the Session ended. So, we spoke and said: "That

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is not the way we saw it, and we hoped others would



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 think about it in similar terms." That eventually
3 became the Western position, and we hope we will be
4 able to go on with what we have begun.

5 What have we begun? Well, we
6 tabled again something analogous to the radiological
7 weapons paper, and a lot of credit had to be given
8 to officialdom, I think, as well as other people
9 contracted to do this kind of thing. Again, a
10 compendium of relevant documentation. Nobody thinks
11 it is something that will set the world on fire, but
12 many, many delegations and members of the Secretariat
13 said this was an invaluable contribution to give a
14 compendium of documentation. It is not, as I say,
15 exciting. It is almost pedestrian. But it is
16 very, very problem oriented, practical, useful.

17
18 What else did we do? Something that
19 would make Anne Gertler happy, although I know that
20 she knew about it when she spoke, and that is we
21 tabled a working paper on the legal regime already
22 existing because there are differences of views on
23 how comprehensive the legal regime is, where are
24 the gaps, where are the loopholes, where do we need
25 to do more work. Of course, on the other side of the
26 coin: is it dangerous to open up an existing treaty
27 in any way unless you are absolutely certain you are
28 not going to erode what you have already agreed upon?
29 There are a lot of delicate issues involved in this.

30 Be that as it may, our paper, based



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 on a study done by the McGill Institute of Air and
3 Space Law, but with a lot of input by members of our
4 own delegation in Geneva, particularly Paul Brochon,
5 as well as people in Ottawa. That paper has been
6 very well received. It is proven, which is exactly
7 what we intended, that the mandate is a useful one,
8 therefore worth continuing. By putting in something
9 instead of having the process gradually develop
10 what the existing legal regime is, by attempting to
11 summarize it, we have pushed the process forward
12 faster. I cannot say whether we will renew the
13 mandate or not, but we have shown that some useful
14 work can be done by some low-key but carefully
15 thought out initiatives, if you want to call it that.

16
17 Again, I might mention that the
18 Canadian intervention saying that this is not a
19 short term mandate became the Western position when
20 it came time to write the report. There was an
21 attempt to say: "Well, all right, we have used
22 that mandate." Well, we did not really. We had
23 very few meetings, but what few meetings we had
24 were very useful.

25 One of the reasons, and you may or
26 may not believe it, why we had a delay was that
27 after we finally got agreement on the mandate, we
28 could not get agreement on a Chairman.

29 The reason was that an Egyptian had
30 been proposed, a good one, and the Iranian was



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 getting even this time, Arabs in general, and he
3 would not agree within the neutral non-aligned group.
4 Nobody wanted to embarrass anyone in that group, so
5 we sat patiently for weeks waiting for that problem
6 to be resolved. It finally was. We had a good
7 Chairman. We did some work.

8 But you can see that there is a mix
9 of inherently difficult, complex issues, and these
10 crazy, procedural roadblocks. I can tell you that
11 we are amongst the most impatient, but we don't just
12 sound impatient, we try and see how to get around
13 these procedural roadblocks.

14 Here too, as I say, we did make these
15 two inputs which have been very favourably received
16 in many, many quarters.

17 I will be very brief on the other
18 issue, but you can see why I could go on at great
19 length and still not cover everything.

20 The Comprehensive Program on Disarma-
21 ment, so-called C.P.D., under the long-standing
22 Chairmanship of Ambassador Garcia Robles, is an
23 exception to the normal rule, because one of the
24 silly things we do is get a new chairman every year,
25 in case the Chairman knows the subject, and is able
26 to get on with it too quickly. But we let him keep
27 his Chairmanship because of his stature, and because
28 it is not going very far very fast anyway. I am
29 being cynical, but the truth is that we did maintain
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 our Chairmanship, and actually made some marginal
3 progress.

4 So, it is not something that is being
5 treated cynically or as a trivial issue. Indeed, I
6 think we could say that we are starting now to focus
7 on text. I think there were eight different drafting
8 groups -- someone could correct me if I am wrong --
9 yes, there were eight different drafting groups.

10 That is not non action, but it is
11 considered peripheral by some, or the heart of the
12 matter by others. It is another issue to which we
13 have to direct attention.

14 We have been involved in this, quite
15 frankly, in a more low key fashion than on other
16 issues, because there is always, in this case, some-
17 one who will press forward and protect our position.

18 But obviously if anyone has any ideas
19 of how to achieve a break-through, we would be
20 receptive.

21
22 Another issue of the Ad Hoc Committee
23 on Effective International Agreements to Assure Non-
24 nuclear Weapon States Against Use or Threat of Use
25 of Nuclear Weapons, is perhaps a declaratory type
26 issue. Nonetheless we have attempted to make progress
27 on that. The real problem is that the perceptions of
28 many non-nuclear states, not all of them in the
29 neutral and non-aligned group, is if we cannot get
30 movement from the nuclear weapons state, then all the



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 rest of us can do is act in a hortatory fashion.
3 What is going to happen on that, I don't know. And,
4 again, questions such as deterrance are raised and
5 are controversial, depending on who is addressing
6 the issue. But we have not got very far on that and
7 I don't expect we will make any breakthrough. At
8 least there was a withdrawal of objections by the
9 Group of 21, the neutral and non-aligned, to the
10 reestablishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. That was
11 something that enabled informal consultations and
12 three meetings of the Committee, and eventual adoption
13 of the Report.

14 The problem there is partly one of
15 perception, partly one of priority. Those who feel
16 strongly about making progress on that issue, feel
17 very strongly; they feel emotional. Others say:
18 "Don't bother us with that when we want to get on with
19 more concrete problems." It is one of the items we
20 have to deal with. It has had a relatively low
21 priority for many countries. You don't find it
22 listed in any list of high Canadian priorities. But
23 we do work on it, and do what we can to push it
24 along.

25
26 You will be pleased to know that I
27 am at the end of my opening presentation. We, I
28 think, are, strangely enough, not under attack for
29 the position we have been taking, which is the kind
30 any good negotiator would take on any issue: try



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 and work your way through or around the procedural
3 roadblock. Don't allow them to become matters of
4 principle, even where they have substantive impli-
5 cations. Basically our approach on every issue is
6 to try and think through where there may be an
7 element of common ground, even where no one wants
8 to perceive it, and then expose it, delineate it
9 in as constructive terms as possible so it does not
10 appear we are saying so-and-so has given way, or
11 anything like that, then press for an attempt to
12 expand the area of common ground.

13 We don't work only within the
14 Western group. We work closely with the neutral
15 non-aligned group wherever we can, and quite frankly,
16 we work quite closely with the Socialist group
17 whenever we can. It is not accidental; it could not
18 happen if we did not work this way, that the annual
19 resolution in the 40th U.N.G.A. on Chemical Weapons
20 is sponsored one year by Poland, and one year by us.

21 We know who are the opponents on
22 each issue, but that is the reason why we talk to
23 them and negotiate with them. What we try and
24 avoid, and persuade others to avoid, is what you
25 can call by a generic term "polemics". We try and
26 avoid simply lecturing everybody. We try and
27 persuade others not to view negotiations as a
28 series of unilateral interventions designed to
29 point the finger at someone else rather than pointing
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 the finger in the direction of possible progress.
3 So that could make us very unpopular, and typically
4 Canadian, and very preachy, but we try and not do
5 it in such a way that it attracts that reaction.
6 I think that if enough people follow that approach --
7 I don't mean merely say it, but do it -- you gradually
8 get something going. I think there are signs that
9 that is happening.

10 All of this activity added up to some
11 400 meetings in the one year related to the Confer-
12 ence on Disarmament. It is obviously a very heavy
13 mandate. We could not do it without the support we
14 get from both officials and academia, and various
15 experts of various kinds. I don't think anyone
16 would tell you, but I would be interested to hear,
17 that Canada is inactive or low profile in whatever
18 might be said in the Conference on Disarmament.

19 Gary Smith mentioned one or two
20 things yesterday that I would happily leave to him
21 and others to explain to you in greater detail.

22 This government, and, on some of
23 these issues, the preceding government, I think
24 we can say there is a bipartisan position on some
25 of these questions, are putting a lot of real money
26 into such questions as verification. We are not
27 confining ourselves to rhetoric. When it comes to
28 a question of trying to put it in writing in a
29 resolution, some of our closest friends are telling
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Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

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2 us: "Don't do it. Drop it. It has become a dirty
3 word." That does not mean they are not going to
4 press for verification, but if we make it our banner,
5 there are those who don't want verification, for
6 various reasons, and say: "Ah ha, it is a reason
7 for blocking progress on everything." Until we
8 reach some stage of utopia where we have so much
9 general trust, not just mutual trust but general
10 trust on a global basis, you cannot really get any
11 kind of arms control agreement, let alone a disarma-
12 ment agreement if it does not have some effective
13 verification provisions in it. It does not mean
14 we cannot make agreements. It means that we cannot
15 dodge or overlook or get around that kind of issue.

16 I was going to give you a separate
17 little talk on outer space, but I have decided I
18 have gone on too long. So, my apologies for doing
19 so. Thank you very much.

20 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ambassador
21 Beesley; Alan. I think I speak for everyone here
22 when I say that I am glad to hear that Canada is not
23 going to set the world on fire!

24 We have time for about eight speakers.
25 There are three held over from yesterday, so that
26 leaves us with about five. I note, to my horror,
27 that there are no name tags, name plates. So, for
28 those of you I don't know, I will have to get your
29



1 Does Brian MacDonald want to speak?
2 BRIAN MACDONALD: Thank you Miss
3 Chairperson.

4 I am approaching this from the stand-
5 point that the aim of this consultative group has
6 been described as one which we are asked to provide
7 suggestions to the Ambassador and his staff as to
8 areas in which we feel that we should proceed.

9 I would like to, at this point, offer
10 cautious support for the principle of multilateralized
11 verification. But having said that, I think I want
12 to qualify why I want that support to be cautious,
13 because I perceive a number of issues that will have
14 to be dealt with in the approach to this, some of
15 which are hardware issues, but much more importantly,
16 I think, are the software issues.

17 Now the hardware issue, of course,
18 is really centered around: Can there be devised
19 means of multilateralized verification which can,
20 in fact, do what they set out to do?

21 I think we have all realized, parti-
22 cularly from Ambassador Beesley's remarks, if we
23 were not aware of it before that intrusive measures
24 of verification are very, very difficult to gain
25 acceptance for, so we are essentially left with non-
26 intrusive measures. Of course, we are perfectly well
27 aware that the favourite methods that have been used
28 by super powers in verification of bilateral agree-
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Brian MacDonald

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2 predominantly satellites.

3 From the hardware standpoint, I would
4 again offer cautious support for a move in that
5 direction. Now whether or not this is the form
6 proposed by ISMA or some other model is, of course,
7 a different question. But I think this is an area
8 that we can go in.

9 There are, of course, some issues of
10 the specific nature of the weapons systems. A
11 satellite may be able to identify strategic nuclear
12 assets much more successfully than it can conventional
13 forces, particularly in those cases of dual capable
14 systems. So, I won't dwell very much more on the
15 hardware issue.

16 But I do want to come down to the
17 software issues. I guess the first issue I would
18 cite here is the question of what agreements are
19 to be verified by multilateral verification. Are
20 they to be bilateral agreements or are they to be
21 multilateral agreements.

22 I could see, for example, a scenario
23 in which it is possible for a multilateral verification
24 agency to deal with a bilateral agreement, but in that
25 case then it exists, in a sense, outside the bilateral
26 partners, and then we have the interesting question
27 of resolving the differences between the multilateral
28 verification agency and the other...



Brian MacDonald

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2 The other issue, of course, of a
3 multilateral agreement seems to be, on the face of
4 it, more amenable to multilateral verification. But,
5 of course, we have had, Ambassador, from your des-
6 cription of the process in the C.D., the difficulty
7 in arriving at the multilateral agreement in the
8 first place.

9 This, I think, brings us down to the
10 question of what will be an even larger issue, and
11 that is: How one constructs the multilateral agency
12 which deals with the data? There is first of all,
13 of course, the issue of what is the data. That agency
14 will have to agree on in fact what is data. It will
15 then have to find some method of achieving a common
16 interpretation or analysis of that data. We see
17 those difficulties in, for example, the issues
18 between the United States and the Soviet Union as to
19 whether or not it is an SS-25 or an SS-13. And both
20 countries take a specific position, and it is then
21 very difficult to achieve an arrangement between the
22 two of them to say that: "Yes, this is in fact the
23 agreed interpretation."
24

25 As we extend the number of partners
26 in that multilateral net, the problem of consensus
27 building would become extremely difficult, but it
28 must be addressed if we are to pursue the area of
29 multilateral verification with any degree to serious-



Brian MacDonald

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2 that this is an area that we can rely upon simply
3 declaratory statements but one that we in fact must
4 take as a hard, concrete, practical proposal and then
5 seek ways of achieving that.

6
7 There is as well, I think, the other
8 issue that must be dealt with when one talks of
9 verification in any area, and that is the issue of
10 compliance. What do we do, what is the schedule for
11 action if verification procedures reveal that the
12 compliance has not taken place? I think, again, that
13 given that arms control agreements are so important
14 we must be conscious of the importance
15 of, in effect, constructing a non-compliance
16 schedule, a schedule of agreed actions which the
17 partners to the agreement can commit themselves to
18 some extent in advance in terms of what happens if
19 the verification procedures indicate that the tenets
20 of the agreement are not taking place.

21 Finally, let me echo David Leyton-Brown's
22 comment of yesterday, his question as to whether the
23 United Nations is in fact the correct vehicle for this
24 type of agreement of a verification nature. Here, of
25 course, one is drawn almost inexorably to the question,
26 for example, of UNESCO, of a United Nations structure
27 with a marvelous history and a record of marvelous
28 achievements which has now moved to a position in
29 which many of the participants have very, very great



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2 take the action and withdrawing it from that. If we
3 are to move into the area of multi-level verification
4 under a U.N. aegis, I think we must be very concerned
5 about the danger of some similar possibility taking
6 place in that particular forum. And if we are ever
7 going to be reassured that that can be avoided, then
8 the software issue becomes much more amenable.

9
10 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Bill
11 Barton.

12 MR. BILL BARTON: Thank you, Madam
13 Chairman. I thought it might be useful if I just gave
14 a brief historical note to illustrate that even though
15 we may be discouraged and disappointed by the pace at
16 which disarmament negotiations and arms control
17 negotiations do not seem to be moving, that in fact
18 if you take a look at where we stood when I was doing
19 Alan's job 10 years ago, there is a tremendous
20 difference.

21 First of all, starting with the
22 Canadian delegation. We had absolutely no money and
23 no support in Ottawa. That did not change until 1978.
24 It was a subject that was regarded as low priority
25 and with lack of interest.

26 The second thing was the operation of,
27 what we called in those days, the Conference of the
28 Committee on Disarmament. It consisted of 26 members,
29 it did not include either the French or the Chinese



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influence in getting the results in 1978 that led to their inclusion.

Thirdly, we had what was known as the Co-Chairmanship, which was that the Russians and the Americans ran at and we could make all the speeches we wanted, and we did of course, but we could not get effective negotiation going until they were ready to do it and constantly we would be told: "we are working on it, we will have something for you in the near future," and as a result the CCD of those days its most effective operation was as a luncheon club. So there has been a tremendous change and I am hopeful that it will lead to results that, in due course, will be for the better. Thank you.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Firdaus Kharas.

MR. KHARAS: Thank you. I just want to go back briefly to yesterday's discussion on the United Nations, and throw out some thoughts.

I just came back from the United Nations, where I was the only Canadian in the General Assembly listening to the large parade of heads of state and heads of government on the 40th anniversary. When I came back a few days ago somebody asked me what were the main issues discussed. As the New York Times called it, it was a collective state of the world message. Certainly the first most important issue



1 from the statements and judging from the discussions
2 on the floor of the General Assembly, was the issue
3 of South Africa and Namibia.

4 The second most important issue was
5 probably economic issues, particularly the debt of
6 Third World countries.

7 The third most important issue was the
8 bilateral relationship outside the United

9 Nations between the United States
10 and the Soviet Union and the upcoming Summit.

11 Somewhere down the list was any issue
12 dealing with arms control and disarmament or disarmament
13 and the United Nations.

14 I think if one could project where the
15 United Nations is going to go in 30 or 40 years from
16 now, when we go back to the 80th anniversary of the
17 United Nations, I personally think that the United Nations
18 that the international community is going to place
19 much greater emphasis on social, economic and
20 humanitarian issues in the United Nations.

21 Now the question comes up -- I have
22 very little doubt about that, I do not know about the
23 impact of that though -- is
24 the international community's greater emphasis to use
25 multilateralism on social, economic and humanitarian
26 areas in variance; is it going to impact in any way
27 on the use of the United Nations in such areas as
28 arms control and disarmament. That is a question I
29



1 the international community putting greater
2 emphasis on the United Nations in that area, and I do
3 see placing greater emphasis on the social, economic
4 and humanitarian areas.

5 On the flip side of the coin, the
6 40th anniversary in itself demonstrated, by the very
7 existence over two weeks with 70 heads of state and
8 governments, the importance the international community
9 attaches to multilateralism, and here I come to Mr.
10 MacDonald and Mr. David Leyton-Brown's comments. I
11 do not see an analogy between what you said and
12 UNESCO, number one; and, number two, even if there is
13 an analogy between the question of arms control and
14 disarmament on the one hand, and what is happening in
15 UNESCO, which is in the area of social issues, on the
16 other hand, even if you take it on a simple structure
17 or institutionalized basis, I think that the existence
18 of the United Nations was demonstrated time and time
19 again during the last two weeks; the importance of
20 multilateralism to the international community. And
21 there is no alternative to the United Nations in
22 multilateralism. That is the only institution, for
23 the moment at least, that we have.

24
25 So if you are going to have anything
26 that is multilateral in this area, such as multilateral
27 verification, to take your example, I do not see how
28 you can get around the United Nations' system in its
29 broadest sense.



1 that I thought in the debate yesterday we focused
2 perhaps exclusively -- although it should be focused
3 on but not perhaps exclusively -- on the mechanism.
4 We discussed the first committee, we discussed the
5 Barton Group, et cetera, et cetera. Those are
6 mechanisms. The purpose of the United Nations' system,
7 as defined in the Charter, is not necessarily to
8 achieve complete disarmament or arms control, it is
9 to maintain international peace and security. I
10 thought we did not pay enough attention, and I would
11 like to draw your attention, to the importance of the
12 general framework created by the United Nations for
13 international relations, that this is stable
14 international order. What does the creation of the
15 framework of international relations, how does that
16 impact on perhaps, what I would call, the narrow issue
17 then of arms control and disarmament? If there were
18 no United Nations tomorrow, would arms control and
19 disarmament issues, even bilateral ones such as the
20 nuclear arms race between these two superpowers, would
21 that problem be exacerbated or would it be assisted
22 without international fora such as the United
23 Nations? Thank you.

24
25 MR. BEESLEY: Well, I suppose this is a
26 question that should be addressed to all of us, and it
27 is not fair for me to answer because my views are
28 fairly well known, I suppose, and you are preaching to
29 the converted, if you are preaching.



1 to multilateralism. I think that bilateralism is
2 necessary, it is essential. But the point, though,
3 Barton made is one I have witnessed in the outer space
4 negotiations. Ultimately there is a curious little
5 coalition of countries who wanted a tougher outer
6 space treaty and it was Iran, Mexico, Canada, India, and
7 one other. A funny little group in some ways, but we
8 eventually agreed to a less satisfactory treaty because
9 it was clear that the two major powers were not
10 prepared to move beyond where they had already gone.
11

12 Those days were the days when I tended
13 to even say sometimes that what we were witnessing
14 was bilateralism covered with a multilateral umbrella.
15 That is not the case now. We cannot get anywhere on
16 nuclear issues and on many, many other issues such
17 as chemical weapons, outer space, without the real
18 involvement of the major powers. Not just the two,
19 either. But that is not to say that therefore we
20 should sit aside and leave it to them, and I personally
21 believe that the multilateral process makes a bigger
22 input than is generally recognized.

23 You happen to know because you pointed
24 out to me the publication of a garbled version of
25 something I had written recently. I will not
26 advertise my article, but I was quite surprised at the
27 conclusions I reached in that article. I started out
28 to write one kind of article, but the further I got



1 what was the input of the multilateral system going
 2 back to the days when Bill Epstein was deeply involved
 3 in the Secretariat, and what is the role of the U.N.
 4 system, the multilateral system, in implementing
 5 these agreements. It is there, usually not anything
 6 as hard with such a cutting edge as verification, but
 7 just there. Because through and through all these
 8 agreements are either indications of a multilateral
 9 origin or a multilateral implementation of some degree
 10 or other, even in bilateral agreements, even in
 11 plurilateral agreements, reached outside the U.N., and
 12 my own conclusion was that we would not have had
 13 nearly as much progress as we would have had without
 14 the U.S., system including when we talk about the
 15 Conference on Disarmament, which is not formally a
 16 U.N. organ which takes instructions from the UNDA,
 17 et cetera.

19 Now, that is not to brush aside the
 20 seriousness and relevance of the questions that were
 21 raised. I think they are exactly the kinds of questions
 22 we have to address. I do not have any easy answers.
 23 But for what it is worth I am one of the many who
 24 hopes we do not go the opting-out route on UNESCO
 25 because I think you could make a case for doing it
 26 in other institutions. We might end up doing away
 27 with Parliament because some days their debates do
 28 not satisfy us. It is just not appropriate, I think,



1 UNCTAD to show what difficulties it was in, how it
2 was beginning to improve and what could be expected
3 when there was a widespread perception of the need to
4 improve a multilateral institution. All I can say is
5 that if we apply the lessons of UNCTAD to UNESCO we
6 do not need to worry about more people getting out.
7 That is a different thing from using a
8 multilateral instrument for verification. But, again,
9 what are the alternatives: to leave it always in the
10 hands of the great powers to police one another and
11 interpret their own data?
12

13 I doubt if any great power is going to
14 welcome, apart from the French involvement with ISMA,
15 a lot of outsiders butting in on something that they
16 consider as touching on their vital security interests,
17 which is what it does touch on, but I think it is a
18 road we have to follow.

19 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I note
20 that we have a few minutes left before our coffee
21 break. I ask the speakers, the questioners, to
22 keep their comments to three minutes, and I am going
23 to be ruthless.

24 William Epstein.

25 MR. EPSTEIN: In order to comply with
26 your request I am not going to make as long a
27 statement thanking Alan Beesley for that excellent
28 and comprehensive and frank survey he gave me. I



1 most urgent, and which most people, I believe here and
2 certainly the United Nations, regard as the most
3 urgent one. The question of comprehensive test ban.

4
5 There have been two recent developments
6 in this field which I think are important. At the
7 NPT Review Conference the final document, by consensus,
8 did call for the resumption of the trilateral three
9 power negotiations for a CTB in 1985, and for the
10 undertaking of negotiations in the CD to elaborate a
11 treaty, also at the earliest possible date. Since,
12 that was adopted by consensus, with only the United
13 States and the United Kingdom dissenting or reserving
14 their position or objecting to it having high
15 priority and saying that deep cuts has higher priority, and
16 since Canada voted for it, I would hope that that will
17 bring about some new ideas, some new proposals from
18 Canada, both in this session of the General Assembly,
19 and in the renewed session of the CD.

20 The other thing I would like to mention
21 is the latest new development, that the six world
22 leaders who were responsible for the five continent
23 peace appeal for a nuclear freeze, about which Ambassador
24 Roach knows a good deal, have just recently
25 written to both Gorbachev and Reagan calling for them
26 to undertake a one year moratorium and to do so at
27 the Summit Conference before the expiration of the
28 Soviet moratorium which expires on January 1st. This



1 some sort of a freeze -- and I was happy to note that
2 Brian Mulroney did consider that you had to have some
3 limits as a freeze to the numbers, otherwise there is
4 not much point in having deep reductions if you are
5 going to go and make more Cruise missiles or bomber
6 missiles or other things, you have got to have some
7 sort of a freeze. I think the best way to start is
8 a comprehensive test ban.

9
10 Finally on
11 that point, both here and at the conference put on
12 by the Peace Institute a couple of weeks ago, speaker
13 after speaker called for Canada to take more
14 independent initiatives and not rely quite so much on
15 alliance solidarity, but that it should decide every
16 one of these issues on the merits. Since Canada has
17 voted for the final document I would hope Canada would
18 consider taking some new substantive as well as
19 procedural initiatives. I am not being provocative,
20 this is what one of the purposes of this entire
21 consultative group and the steering committee of the
22 group, we have heard again and again, we are looking
23 for new initiatives, new ideas. Here, it seems to
24 me, is the best and easiest at hand idea, particularly
25 since the United States is now franker than it was
26 before. It now admits that verification is not the
27 main reason for its not wanting to resume the
28 negotiations. The main reason is it wants to go ahead



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Now, in 1977 the two laboratories, the Lawrence Livermore and the Los Alamos, sent letters to Washington agreeing that they could live with a five to 10 kilotonne threshold. But new things have happened since then. At the NPT Review Conference the Swedish Ambassador, and Sweden has got a great deal of expertise here, said that you can now, with dense arrays, with new technological developments and discoveries, you can now verify and identify not down to one kilotonne but down to .001 kilotonne, down to one tonne and even in an explosion in a big hole cavern which is muffled or decoupled, you can identify down to 10 tonnes, not 10 kilotonnes. Certainly that is as good as anybody could want.

So therefore my question and my plea is: what new ideas or proposals in the light of these new developments is Canada now considering to take at this session of the General Assembly and next session of the CD?

MR. BEESLEY: I will pass to Bill on this.



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Bill has been saying that the U.S. is being publicly frank in stating its position that, as a long term objective, it accepts a complete test ban in NTB. But for the foreseeable future, at least in the short term, they need the right, the opportunity, to go on testing. That is point number one.

On verifiability and identification there really are a variety of views. I have heard the Swedish views supported, I have heard them rejected, but the caveat in a sense, if you have got a dense enough array, is a part of the key to the answer. I went to this workshop in Norway and learned a bit that I thought I already knew. They have got a very sophisticated set of arrays now. I cannot tell you because I have not checked it out with the various parts of the decision-making process in Ottawa, but I mentioned it the other day in another context, that the Swedish Ambassador was critical of Canada for not playing an active enough role in the detection process. I reported it back. I did not think it was a fair comment, but I wanted to know.

In any event, whether it is or whether it is not, you have heard the announcement that we are going to upgrade our arrays, our seismic arrays, in Yellowknife. That is a part of the key to it. I doubt if many people would disagree that if you have enough arrays in the right locations, which could include the USSR, you might then find this an amicable



1 problem.

2 I had not heard myself that it would be
3 down to the limits you are suggesting for -- I am
4 afraid I have forgotten the term -- of our suspended
5 nuclear explosions, not based on hard rock, for
6 example. But it is an area where Canada can make an
7 input even though we do not have the final answers
8 because we are not carrying out a testing program, we
9 do not have the same level of technology. But it is
10 an area in which we obviously have to do some serious
11 thinking, but also take some action.

12 I cannot say more than that because
13 you are getting beyond my technical expertise and,
14 although the Swedes have a tremendous amount of
15 expertise on this, they have the same handicap we have
16 in spite of the funny little tests they made during
17 the Stockholm Environmental Conference.

18 Thank you very much.

19 THE CHAIRPERSON: The next speaker is
20 Hanna Newcombe.

21 DR. HANNA NEWCOMBE: Thank you. I would
22 like to add my voice to the praise of international
23 organizations that we have heard around the room
24 already. While bilateral negotiations are, of course,
25 essential I think the multilateral are equally
26 essential, maybe in a different way, and certainly a
27 lot is going on at the CD as we heard presented this
28 morning.

29 I would also tend to defend UNESCO even
30



1 though I do not want to spend too much time on that
2 since that is not a prime topic here. I think whatever
3 bureaucratic inefficiencies there are are probably
4 common in other bureaucracies and other situations
5 of that type, and there is no need to single out UNESCO
6 as a scapegoat of inefficiency. I think UNESCO has
7 done good work and can still do so.

8 I would also like to refer to another
9 development at the United Nations where the U.S. has
10 said that they will require in the future weighted
11 voting on financial decisions, weighted by contributions
12 to the U.N. budget, and almost presented it as a threat
13 of leaving the U.N. altogether if this is not
14 implemented. I heard a commentator say, well, weighting
15 by contributions to the budget of course would be
16 unacceptable to those who only pay a small contribution
17 weighting by population would be unacceptable to
18 countries with small populations and, therefore, the
19 commentator said, weighted voting at the U.N. is a
20 dead end. Now, I do not see that the "therefore"
21 follows because in our own study we have studied 25
22 different weighted voting proposals where you combine
23 the two kinds of indicators and do various other
24 things, and some of them managed to be fair to
25 everybody.

26
27 Since strengthening international
28 organizations, I think, is one of the pillars of
29 international peace and security, this should probably
30 be looked at again in a totally different spirit from



1 the U.S. proposal but with an open mind to the various
2 possibilities that exist here. I think it could very
3 well enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the
4 United Nations in all fields, not only disarmament.

5 Thank you.

6 THE CHAIRPERSON: Paul Cappon.

7 MR. PAUL CAPPON: How encouraged I was
8 by Bill Barton's remarks. I think they are the most positive
9 things I think I have heard thus far. I have one
10 comment and one question for Ambassador Beesley.

11 The comment is this: that I am somewhat
12 concerned that, Ambassador Beesley, you appear to
13 speak with more energy and perhaps more vigor about
14 control of chemical weapons and less about nuclear
15 weapons. I do not think we need to be persuaded
16 here about the horrors of chemical weapons, and I hope
17 that the reason for this relative greater enthusiasm
18 is neither that Canada intends to play a kind of a
19 specialist/moralist role in this matter nor, I hope,
20 because it so happens that the U.S. is demonstrating
21 perhaps more constructiveness regarding this question
22 than about nuclear issues.

23 The question which I have, and I think
24 it echoes a little bit William Epstein's remarks
25 earlier, has to do with remarks which you made
26 regarding a perhaps implicit criticism about
27 non-aligned and developing nations and their attitude
28 in the Conference on Disarmament.

29 I think we agree that polemics perhaps
30



1 and personality and procedural problems should not
2 occur but you did not mention very much about the
3 substance of their positions. I am wondering if,
4 given the fact that they are non-aligned and neutral
5 and therefore by definition the substance of their
6 remarks and the substance of their contribution should
7 be taken very seriously, whether we are in fact taking
8 them seriously and whether we are considering the
9 substance of their positions in going beyond the
10 polemics and personalities.

11 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Albert?

12 PROFESSOR ALBERT LEGAULT: Merci, Madame
13 le Président.

14 J'aimerais tout d'abord féliciter
15 l'ambassadeur Beesley pour son remarquable exposé.
16 Jusqu'à maintenant, je pensais qu'il y avait deux
17 types d'ambassadeur: ceux qui disent rien et ceux
18 qui parlaient tellement qu'on ne savait pas où était
19 la vérité. Vous faites manifestement partie d'une
20 troisième catégorie et je préfère vous féliciter
21 immédiatement.

22 Mon point d'intervention portera
23 essentiellement sur les armes chimiques et biologi-
24 ques. C'est beaucoup plus une question qu'un
25 commentaire. Je me demandais s'il y avait des
26 parallèles à faire entre le contrôle des armes
27 bactériologiques et chimiques et le contrôle de
28 l'énergie atomique à des fins civiles.
29
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1 Il a fallu beaucoup d'années avant
2 qu'un traité sur, que les origines, si vous voulez,
3 que des «safeguards» dans le domaine de l'énergie
4 nucléaire soient conclus, il a fallu beaucoup
5 d'années avant que l'Union soviétique accepte même
6 le principe d'ouvrir, en fait, certaines de ses
7 installations nucléaires au contrôle des inspecteurs
8 de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique
9 et en ce qui a trait au traité sur les armes
10 bactériologiques et chimiques, peut-être qu'il ne
11 faudrait pas régler immédiatement tous les problèmes,
12 et je pense que vous avez raison en réponse à
13 une intervention précédente, de citer le rôle très
14 important au niveau de la codification du droit
15 international que jouent les institutions
16 internationales.

17 Je pense qu'il y a peut-être une
18 expérience qu'il faudra regarder à fond, c'est
19 l'expérience de l'Union européenne occidentale,
20 le «Western European Union» qui a un réseau
21 d'inspection et d'intrusion très poussé pour
22 interdire en fait à l'Allemagne, en vertu des
23 accords de Paris de 1954, de produire des armements
24 bactériologiques ou chimiques. Je me demande
25 si effectivement on ne pourrait pas utiliser le
26 contrôle du régionalisme et construire à partir
27 de ces institutions, pour ensuite de proche en
28 proche étendre cette série de contrôle et en arriver
29 à un régime internationale qui soit plus important.
30



1 Je pense que c'est une expérience
2 qui est tout à fait remarquable et qu'il faudrait
3 étudier davantage et je pense qu'au niveau du droit
4 international, même au niveau des contrôles
5 politiques, plus on pourra faire des parallèles entre
6 le contrôle de l'énergie atomique, et le contrôle
7 des armes bactériologiques et chimiques, je pense
8 que plus on arrivera à résoudre les problèmes
9 politiques qui pour l'instant sont peut-être
10 très importants. Je sais parfaitement, par exemple,
11 qu'il faut contrôler 25,000 industries si on veut
12 vraiment contrôler les armes bactériologiques et
13 chimiques.

14 Mais le problème politique ne
15 m'apparaît le plus important; c'est d'abord le
16 problème d'établir un régime juridique de contrôle
17 et d'inspection. Une fois qu'on aura établi cela,
18 on pourra peut-être aller un peu plus loin.

19 Alors c'était un commentaire qui
20 est aussi une forme de question. Merci, monsieur
21 l'ambassadeur.
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1 THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

2 AMBASSADOR ALAN BEESLEY: I always start
3 by saying I will be brief, and I never quite manage it.

4 To the penultimate speaker I can speak
5 very vigorously on the control of nuclear weapons,
6 particularly the CTB. My difficulty on that is I
7 cannot do much more than speak except add my voice
8 and my functional experience, whatever you may call
9 it, to the attempt to narrow the gap both in
10 perceptions and whatever may be actual and visible and
11 provable on the question of verification. I did touch
12 on that. I do not think that there is any doubt about
13 the Canadian position or that, to my knowledge,
14 anyone is luke warm about it. Bill Epstein brought
15 out some of the difficulties, and I do not want to
16 dwell on that.

17 Insofar as the non-aligned are concerned,
18 sometimes I worry that we take them too seriously. I am
19 not concerned about them not being taken seriously
20 enough. To be quite frank with you, sometimes I
21 intervene in Western group discussions to say let's
22 stop trying to be popular with the neutral non-aligned
23 and be more concerned about reflecting the views of
24 our own publics. It is something that I have said
25 more than once, that there may be a coincidence of
26 positions but many of the neutral non-aligned have
27 very well thought out, very sophisticated and very
28 concrete positions. I hardly need to single them
29 out, but you can hardly accuse someone like Ambassador
30



1 Garcia Robles of being uninformed. You could hardly
2 accuse Sweden of being frivolous on these issues.
3 Sri Lanka -- I do not want to name countries or
4 individuals, but if we did not take them seriously we
5 would not be very effective ourselves.

6 On the questions of relative priorities,
7 I think I tend to exert my energies on where I can
8 see the possibility of progress without thereby
9 downgrading priorities, something else that may be even
10 more important but where there is something that we
11 cannot do as much about in the immediate future. I
12 do not say that the two approaches are mutually
13 excluded.

14 On what Albert Legault said I think that
15 is very interesting, the points he has made. Some of
16 us had also noted the Russian offers within the IAEA
17 context, and I do not know yet what we are doing about
18 it but I know that we are aware of it and trying to
19 build it into, in one case, a study, quite a serious
20 study of all of the Russian initiatives or responses
21 on verification on any issue because that is the way
22 I think it has to be approached. That is being done
23 and it is being done seriously. The IAEA is an example.

24 The western European experience you
25 mentioned is quite an interesting one. I suppose I
26 can see the difficulties, as you can, the differences,
27 where they might agree to intrusiveness in a certain
28 context and not in another but it is something that I
29 consider worth thinking about and trying to build upon
30



1 to see whether we can apply that, especially with some
2 of the same countries and saying why did you agree to
3 it there and not elsewhere. So I find your comments
4 very helpful.

5 The whole question of the need to
6 develop a juridical regime, it is not merely the long
7 term objective, I think it is at the heart of the
8 approach we have to take as long as we do not make it
9 sound too legal and frighten off all the political
10 scientists and military people. We can develop the
11 law quite effectively when there is a scope for it.

12 Thank you very much.

13 THE CHAIRPERSON: Harold von Reikoff.

14 DR. HAROLD VON REIKOFF: Ambassador
15 Beesley made a very persuasive case for a partial
16 step-by-step complete test ban rather than trying to
17 go for the whole thing immediately. Of course that
18 is what we have been doing in the last 20 years and
19 we had a partial test ban rather than a CTB signed in
20 1963.

21
22 I wonder if he could give us his own
23 private views perhaps, since he has been very frank
24 with us, and perhaps also some of the views in Geneva
25 in response to the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on
26 CTB because we should remind ourselves that it was not
27 a moratorium that preceded and I would say perhaps
28 facilitated the initial partial test ban treaty of
29 1963. Similarly, there was the 1969 unilateral U.S.
30 moratorium on biological weapons which preceded, and



1 would also say facilitated the signing of the 1972
2 biological weapons convention. So is there this route
3 that would in fact facilitate progress on the
4 step-by-step partial route to a complete test ban?

5 AMBASSADOR ALAN BEESLEY: Well, that is
6 the kind of question where I can state quite candidly
7 that I have to reflect the views of the government
8 and in so saying on that kind of issue I necessarily
9 follow instructions and in so saying I do not imply a
10 difference of views with my instructions. But I think
11 it is not the kind of thing where I should even attempt
12 to hold a personal discussion. The position was
13 outlined very clearly yesterday by Doug Roach.

14 It is worth noting that we have never
15 opposed any moratoria on any issue per se as a matter
16 of principle. It has happened and it has had effects,
17 as you reminded us, the idea of a limit, which is
18 another part of the approach many are suggesting.

19 One thing I can do is repeat myself in
20 one case that if one could -- you either need mutual
21 trust or you need all the elements of verification
22 that substitute for mutual trust. Even then you have
23 a necessity for mutual trust. But the difficulty
24 about moratoria very often, or suspensions, is the
25 need to have enough of a common ground of perception
26 on the part of both sides if they are each agreed that
27 one is not going to get an advantage out of that
28 particular period. If one had just finished a series
29 of tests, for example. But it is not a theological
30



1 question for Canada, to my knowledge, that in no case
2 can you ever have some kind of suspension of a
3 particular kind of activity, and we are all aware of
4 examples.

5 In this case we are not supporting the
6 moratorium approach per se for the reasons you have
7 already heard expressed. I cannot say more than
8 that. There is a difficulty that I always find, a
9 conceptual difficulty in attempting in a sense to
10 prejudge all the elements in a situation by a sweeping
11 measure. It does not mean that it is not the best way
12 to approach it or the only way sometimes, but you have
13 to be aware that that is what you are doing and it
14 means having a fairly detailed and sophisticated
15 knowledge of the range of issues in play in the
16 bilaterals, for example, in saying freeze at this
17 stage. Because if you freeze an imbalance it will not
18 last and if you try for a freeze when there is a
19 perceived imbalance you will not get it. We have to
20 be very careful, in my opinion, about pressing for
21 something that will make us feel better because we
22 have done it but it will not achieve results.

23
24 I am not prejudging even that.
25 Enough western states pressing for a moratorium might
26 have the effect that you suggest is desirable. Maybe
27 I have said too much already having said I would not
28 give personal views. It is a very sensitive issue,
29 it is also a very important one and the views around
30 this table are obviously not only acceptable but useful



1 in helping any government develop its own policy on
2 such questions.

3 Thank you very much.

4 THE CHAIRPERSON: It is after 11 o'clock
5 and I would like to ask that David Leyton-Brown, would
6 you keep your comments for the afternoon session? Is
7 that agreeable?

8 PROFESSOR DAVID LEYTON-BROWN: I have
9 what I think is a very simple question, or at least I
10 hope it is a simple question, that really needs an
11 answer from Ambassador Beesley if he can. So maybe
12 we had better take one moment.

13 I just wanted to ask if you could give
14 your impression of the discernable effect of the
15 exhortatory resolutions that we talked about yesterday
16 that issue from the first committee and the UNGA on
17 the CD itself. Do those resolutions have the visible
18 effect of shaping the agenda; are they used consciously
19 to affect national delegation positions, or do they
20 exist in isolation from what you so thoroughly described
21 to us?

22
23 AMBASSADOR ALAN BEESLEY: Well, that is
24 a good question but it is an easy one to answer. They
25 are not ignored. The internal negotiations in the
26 Western group indicate the importance of it. What
27 Doug has described here, which I did for a year and
28 chaired that Barton group, is ample evidence of the
29 importance we attach vis-a-vis one another on the
30 positions we take on those resolutions where we can



1 persuade all our allies to accept a position which we
2 may hold but not all of them, then we are hopeful
3 that we can use that and cite it in the CD and we do;
4 usually privately but sometimes publicly. So they are
5 not resolutions that hang in a vacuum.

6 We attach importance to them, not just
7 in determining our own position, our own vote, but in
8 trying to so word them that we can maximize the
9 possibility for movement, expand the common ground
10 and, believe me, the amount of intensive consultation
11 that goes on, that Doug has been involved in and will
12 be on the right language to use on CTB is indicative.
13 We want neither to go so far that we make it easy for
14 someone to vote against it and we would like to have
15 voting for it, but neither do we want it so weak that
16 they can abstain on it or even vote for it then have
17 nothing to work with in the CD. We do not take
18 instructions from the UNGA but we take it very seriously.
19

20 Thank you very much.

21 THE CHAIRPERSON: Just before you go,
22 there is an announcement regarding the working groups

23 MR. NEIL REIDER: I just wanted to
24 mention that for the monitors that officials
25 participating in the working groups will be dialoguing
26 and answering questions and making comments but in
27 drawing up consensus on points as to new initiatives
28 officials will not participate in that. That will
29 just be members of the consultative group. So that is
30 just for monitors to note.



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THE CHAIRPERSON: For any of you who do not know which working group you are in, John Lamb and Neil Reider will be available to tell you which room you are supposed to be in.

Thank you.

---ADJOURNMENT

