



CANADA

The Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations
at Geneva

La Mission Permanente du Canada
auprès des Nations Unies
à Genève

STATEMENT BY

H.E. J. ALAN BEESLEY,

AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA

HEAD OF DELEGATION

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

FOR THE

PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

GENEVA

MARCH 23 - APRIL 10, 1987

MARCH 25, 1987

MR PRESIDENT,

LET ME FIRST CONGRATULATE YOU ON YOUR ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THIS CONFERENCE AND ASSURE YOU OF THE ENTIRE SUPPORT OF MY DELEGATION IN THE DIFFICULT TASK YOU HAVE SO GRACIOUSLY ACCEPTED.

IT IS NOW NEARLY TEN YEARS SINCE THE IDEA OF A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY WAS FIRST LAUNCHED. DURING THAT PERIOD, THE WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK HAS CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY AND NUCLEAR SUPPLIER NATIONS HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR POLICIES. MORE RECENTLY, THE WORLD SUFFERED ITS FIRST MAJOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. CHERNOBYL HAS BRUTALLY REMINDED US OF OUR INTERDEPENDENCE AND OF THE IMPACT OUR POLICIES AND PRACTICES CAN HAVE ON ONE ANOTHER. IT HAS, OF COURSE, ALSO HEIGHTENED THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY.

THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE CONFERENCE HAVE SIMILARLY EVOLVED, WHICH HAS MADE PREPARATIONS FOR OUR WORK VERY DIFFICULT AND LABORIOUS. IT WILL HAVE TAKEN SEVEN SESSIONS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE AND A NUMBER OF MORE INFORMAL MEETINGS TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREEMENT ON HOW TO APPROACH OUR AGENDA AND ORGANIZE THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. THIS, MR PRESIDENT, IS CLEARLY A REFLECTION OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES FACING US.

THE PRINCIPLES FIRST EMBODIED IN UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 32/50 OF DECEMBER 8, 1977, AND RECONFIRMED EVERY YEAR AFTER, ARE STILL VALID TODAY AND SHOULD PROVE AN EXCELLENT GUIDE AS WE WORK OUR WAY THROUGH OUR AGENDA AND THE NUMEROUS QUESTIONS IT RAISES.

FOR THE RECORD, LET ME BRIEFLY RECALL THESE PRINCIPLES:

- A) RECOGNITION OF THE CONTRIBUTION THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY CAN MAKE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT;
- B) RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES;
- C) RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES; AND,
- D) AGREEMENT THAT NUCLEAR COOPERATION MUST TAKE PLACE UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS APPLIED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

ALL THE DELEGATIONS REPRESENTED HERE TODAY SHARE A COMMON BELIEF THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND WELL-BEING OF THEIR PEOPLES. THEY ALSO SHARE A COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE WITH ONE ANOTHER TO ENSURE THAT ALL COUNTRIES HAVE ACCESS TO THE BENEFITS OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND TECHNOLOGY. IN ADDITION, MOST OF THE COUNTRIES ATTENDING THIS CONFERENCE ARE SIGNATORIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT). THEY ARE THUS UNITED IN A STRONG AND COMPREHENSIVE COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION WHICH THEY HAVE ACCEPTED TO HAVE VERIFIED BY THE APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO THE FULL SCOPE OF THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. THIS BEING SAID, THERE ARE, OF COURSE, DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION FRAMEWORK REQUIRED FOR NUCLEAR COOPERATION TO TAKE PLACE, AS EVIDENCED BY SOME OF THE PAPERS CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFERENCE. SOME OF THESE DIFFERENCES CAN PROBABLY BE BRIDGED QUITE EASILY. OTHERS ARE MUCH MORE FUNDAMENTAL.

IF OUR WORK IS TO BE PRODUCTIVE AND YIELD CONCRETE RESULTS, WE NEED TO FOCUS FIRST AND FOREMOST ON THOSE AREAS WHERE THERE APPEARS TO BE A GOOD BASIS FOR AGREEMENT AND ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE APPROACH WE MIGHT WISH TO TAKE TO THESE QUESTIONS BEST SUITED TO ENSURING PROGRESS.

THE REPORTS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE REGIONAL GROUPS OF EXPERTS CLEARLY INDICATE A BROAD DEGREE OF CONSENSUS ON THE

SUBJECTS TO BE ADDRESSED. THE DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND OTHER TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS AMPLY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND CAPABILITIES EXIST FOR THE WORK AT HAND.

LET ME NOW TURN TO THE IMPRESSIVE PROGRAM OF WORK BEFORE US. COMMITTEE II, IN PARTICULAR, WILL HAVE BEFORE IT A LONG LIST OF QUESTIONS WHICH COVER THE ENTIRE RANGE OF APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER OF INTERESTS REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE AND THE DIFFICULTY OF DEVISING SOLUTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS, APPLICABLE TO ALL, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT IN THE EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES BEFORE US, WE TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION DIFFERING LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT, REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES. THIS WOULD FACILITATE THE IDENTIFICATION OF CONCRETE SOLUTIONS SPECIFIC TO CERTAIN TYPES OF SITUATIONS. WE CAN DRAW FROM THE DOCUMENT PREPARED BY THE IAEA FOR THE CONFERENCE A NUMBER OF EXCELLENT PRINCIPLES WHICH WE COULD USE TO GUIDE US IN OUR DELIBERATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, THE DOCUMENT POINTS OUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MATCHING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPMENT LEVELS AND LISTS A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS WHICH, IN THE AGENCY'S EXPERIENCE, NEED TO BE MET FOR A NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM TO BE ESTABLISHED. THESE RELATE TO THE NEED FOR A COMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE TO BE IN PLACE BEFORE CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES BEGINS. THIS, IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MY COUNTRY, IS INDEED ESSENTIAL. THE DOCUMENT ALSO DRAWS OUR ATTENTION TO THE

WEALTH OF EXPERTISE DEVELOPED BY THE IAEA OVER MANY YEARS OF ASSISTING COUNTRIES IN DEVELOPING THEIR NUCLEAR PLANS AND PROGRAMS. THE AGENCY HAS INTRODUCED A NUMBER OF PLANNING SYSTEMS, INCLUDING COMPUTER MODELS WHICH COULD BE MODIFIED OR DEVELOPED AS APPROPRIATE TO FURTHER ASSIST COUNTRIES IN FORMULATING THEIR NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PLANS. THE PROMOTION OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IS ANOTHER AREA WHERE THE IAEA HAS DEvised WORKING TOOLS. RECOGNIZING THE FACT THAT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES CUT ACROSS TRADITIONAL SECTORAL BOUNDARIES, THE AGENCY IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING MULTI-DISCIPLINARY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT EVOLUTIONARY STEP FORWARD AND ONE WHICH WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND AS WE REVIEW THE ISSUES ON OUR WORK PROGRAM. FOR EXAMPLE, IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO DECIDE FIRST ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CENTRAL NUCLEAR POWER STATION, ONLY LATER TO DISCOVER THAT PLANNED INDUSTRIAL USES HAVE NOT MATERIALIZED OR THAT THE POWER GRID ENVISAGED IS TOO COSTLY TO DISTRIBUTE THE ELECTRIC OUTPUT EFFECTIVELY. OR, AGAIN, BEFORE NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY, HANDLING AND STORAGE SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED AND SECURED.

MR PRESIDENT, CANADA'S RECORD IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO SHARE THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITH OTHERS. OUR FIRST NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROJECTS WERE INDEED PART OF OUR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EFFORT AND STEMMED FROM A STRONG DESIRE ON OUR PART TO SHARE THE BEST AND MOST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WE HAD TO OFFER WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. SINCE THOSE EARLY DAYS, CANADA HAS

CONTINUED TO PROVE A RELIABLE NUCLEAR COOPERATION PARTNER. WE HAVE CURRENTLY IN PLACE NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH OVER TWENTY COUNTRIES, A NUMBER OF WHICH ARE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THESE AGREEMENTS COVER THE FULL RANGE OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR CANADA'S URANIUM EXPORTS OF ROUGHLY \$1 BILLION A YEAR AS WELL AS TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT LINKED TO THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF CANDU POWER STATIONS, INCLUDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING. IN ADDITION, CANADA HAS DEVELOPED UNIQUE EXPERTISE IN THE FIELD OF RADIO-ISOTOPE TECHNOLOGY WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO SHARE WITH ALL COUNTRIES WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD NOW LIKE TO RAISE A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO CANADIANS. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND THE NECESSARY TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY INEVITABLY ENTAIL RISKS OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. SUPPLIER NATIONS AS WELL AS RECIPIENTS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THAT THESE RISKS ARE MINIMIZED AND, WHERE POSSIBLE, ELIMINATED ALTOGETHER. CANADA, FOR ITS PART, HAS IN PLACE A WELL DEFINED AND ARTICULATED POLICY WHICH PROVIDES THE FRAMEWORK FOR ITS NUCLEAR COOPERATION RELATIONSHIPS. IT IS STRONGLY ANCHORED IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY COUPLED WITH THE VERIFICATION CAPABILITY PROVIDED BY IAEA SAFEGUARDS. UNDER THE CANADIAN POLICY, NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES ARE ELIGIBLE TO BECOME NUCLEAR PARTNERS ONLY IF THEY HAVE RATIFIED THE NPT OR MADE AN EQUIVALENT

COMPREHENSIVE, LEGALLY-BINDING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT TO NON-PROLIFERATION AND HAVE ACCEPTED IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON ALL THEIR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, PRESENT AND FUTURE. IN ADDITION, ALL OF CANADA'S NUCLEAR COOPERATION PARTNERS, NON-NUCLEAR AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES ALIKE, MUST CONCLUDE WITH CANADA A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH TREATY FORCE. THIS AGREEMENT SETS A NUMBER OF NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS SPECIFIC TO CANADIAN-ORIGIN NUCLEAR MATERIAL, MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THE MAIN PROVISIONS INCLUDE:

- A) A COMMITMENT THAT CANADIAN NUCLEAR ITEMS WILL NOT BE USED FOR PURPOSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES;
- B) A PROVISION THAT SAFEGUARDS MUST CONTINUE TO BE APPLIED TO CANADIAN-ORIGIN NUCLEAR ITEMS IN THE EVENT THAT, FOR WHATEVER REASON, THE IAEA IS NO LONGER ABLE TO APPLY ITS SAFEGUARDS REGIME;
- C) A PROVISION FOR CANADIAN PRIOR CONSENT TO THE TRANSFER OF CANADIAN NUCLEAR ITEMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES;
- D) A PROVISION FOR CANADIAN PRIOR CONSENT TO THE HIGH ENRICHMENT OF CANADIAN URANIUM AND THE REPROCESSING OF CANADIAN SPENT FUEL;
- E) AN ASSURANCE THAT ADEQUATE MEASURES OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION WILL BE APPLIED TO CANADIAN NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

THIS NUCLEAR COOPERATION POLICY, ONE OF THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE APPLIED BY ANY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, HAS BEEN RECONFIRMED BY SUCCESSIVE CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1976. OVER THE DECADE SINCE THEN, EACH NEW CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IN TURN HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE COMPREHENSIVE REQUIREMENTS I HAVE JUST OUTLINED ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IF WE ARE TO ENSURE, TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE OF CANADA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT LARGE THAT CANADIAN NUCLEAR EXPORTS WILL NOT RESULT IN FURTHER PROLIFERATION. AN ADDITIONAL, IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF THE POLICY IS THE PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF NUCLEAR TRADE IT GENERATES. WITHOUT A WELL ARTICULATED NON-PROLIFERATION FRAMEWORK, THERE CAN BE NO NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

AMONG THE TWENTY-TWO COUNTRIES THAT NOW COUNT THEMSELVES AS FULL NUCLEAR COOPERATION PARTNERS OF CANADA'S, THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION THAT NATIONAL NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT OR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN HINDERED IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER BY THE REQUIREMENTS OF CANADIAN POLICY. INDEED, WE HAVE STRIVEN TO MAKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR POLICY AS PRAGMATIC AND PREDICTABLE AS POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE ORDERLY CONDUCT OF NUCLEAR COMMERCE. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE ADOPTED A GENERIC CONSENT APPROACH TO THE REPROCESSING OF CANADIAN SPENT FUEL AND THE SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE SEPARATED PLUTONIUM WITH THOSE OF OUR NUCLEAR COOPERATION PARTNERS WHICH HAVE A MATURE AND WELL-DEVELOPED PROGRAM CALLING FOR THE USE OF PLUTONIUM. AS WELL, WE ARE CURRENTLY DEVELOPING WITH OUR PARTNERS A MECHANISM WHEREBY

CANADIAN PRIOR CONSENT TO THE RETRANSFER OF THOSE MATERIALS AT THE FRONT END OF THE FUEL CYCLE (NATURAL URANIUM, LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM, OTHER SOURCE MATERIAL, HEAVY WATER) WOULD BE GRANTED ON A ONE TIME BASIS, PROVIDED CERTAIN NON-PROLIFERATION REQUIREMENTS ARE IN PLACE. WE HAVE, IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, ALSO AGREED TO AN INNOVATIVE PROCEDURE UNDER WHICH COUNTRIES AGREE TO TRANSFER NON-PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL, RATHER THAN PHYSICALLY TRANSFERRING THE MATERIAL ITSELF, IN ORDER TO AVOID THE COSTS AND THE SECURITY RISKS INVOLVED IN REPEATED TRANSATLANTIC SHIPMENTS. THIS IS DONE ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS, TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF A PURELY COMMERCIAL NATURE AND SUBJECT TO A NUMBER OF POLICY REQUIREMENTS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO DIMINUTION IN NON-PROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS.

I WISH TO REITERATE THAT OUR EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT NON-PROLIFERATION REQUIREMENTS DO NOT ACT AS CONSTRAINTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. RATHER, THEY PROVIDE THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH NUCLEAR COMMERCE MUST BE CONDUCTED IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS TO BE REASSURED THAT SUCH COOPERATION WILL NOT PROMOTE PROLIFERATION. IN SHORT, MY POINT IS THAT NON-PROLIFERATION CONSIDERATIONS ARE DISTINCT FROM AND UNRELATED TO COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS. THEY ARE BASED SOLELY ON SECURITY CONCERNS. UNCE REQUIRED NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MET, NUCLEAR COMMERCE CAN TAKE PLACE ON A UNIVERSAL AND NON DISCRIMINATORY BASIS, WITHOUT POLITICAL INTERFERENCE.

MY DELEGATION WILL FURTHER ADDRESS NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES IN THE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS THAT WILL FOLLOW IN COMMITTEE I.

EVERY COUNTRY REPRESENTED HERE SHARES THE SAME CONCERN THAT NUCLEAR COOPERATION NOT RESULT IN FURTHER PROLIFERATION. WE SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE SHY ABOUT USING THE WORK OF THIS CONFERENCE AND PARTICULARLY OF COMMITTEE I TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. IN THE VIEW OF MY DELEGATION, THE FINAL DECLARATION OF THE THIRD NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, CIRCULATED BY SWEDEN IN DOCUMENT A/CONF.108/L.8, A DOCUMENT AGREED BY NO FEWER THAN 86 COUNTRIES, PROVIDES A GOOD STARTING POINT FOR OUR EFFORTS.

THANK YOU, MR PRESIDENT.