



CANADA

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The Permanent Mission of Canada  
to the United Nations  
at Geneva

La Mission Permanente du Canada  
auprès des Nations Unies  
à Genève

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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR J. ALAN BEESLEY

BEFORE THE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 1987

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Mr. President,

I have asked for the floor to report on one workshop relating to seismic verification which took place in Canada last year and to give advance information on another workshop, this one on Outer Space, which will be held in the middle of May. Both workshops have one point in common: they relate to verification of eventual agreements in the field of Disarmament and Arms Control, which is a high priority for the Government of Canada. I will also make a brief reference to some very concrete verification issues relating to our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, on which Canada is also doing some practical research.

On the first subject, I would like to introduce a working paper relating to Item 1, (Nuclear Test Ban), reporting on the proceedings of the workshop hosted by Canada on waveform data exchange last October in Ottawa.

On a number of occasions I have emphasized in this forum the importance that Canada attaches to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. The realization of a negotiated and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty constitutes a fundamental Canadian

arms control and disarmament objective, and Canada will continue to pursue this goal with vigour, persistence and determination.

There are, regrettably, no shortcuts or panaceas for the achievement of this important objective. It can be realized only through realistic and practical steps which will develop the confidence necessary to enable us to move forward. Our failure during this spring session to reach agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on a comprehensive test ban is most disappointing. Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee would allow us to make progress in a concrete, pragmatic and constructive fashion. I hope that we can do better in the summer session.

We have made clear consistently that Canada attaches particular importance to the improvement of means of verification of a comprehensive test ban, and Canada is devoting considerable human and financial resources both domestically and internationally to seismic verification. Measures Canada has taken include the major upgrading of key seismic facilities in Northern Canada and support for basic seismic research.

In order to expedite the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, Canada conducted in October in Ottawa of last year a workshop for seismic experts to discuss questions relating to the

exchange of level 2 waveform data with a view to resolving some of the questions concerning the exchange of such data.

I am pleased today to table CD/753 of 28 April to which are annexed the proceedings of the Ottawa workshop. As the document indicates, the workshop, which was attended by 43 representatives from 17 countries produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. These have already been tabled by the Canadian delegation in the GSE, the key forum for coordination of international efforts to develop an effective global seismic monitoring network, as recommendations for seismic waveform exchange in that eventual system. I hope that these proceedings will be of interest to all members of the CD.

I would be remiss if I did not, on behalf of the Canadian Government, express our gratitude to the participants who helped to make the workshop a success.

Mr. President, we are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a substantive role to play in the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

There are important related talks going on bilaterally which we hope will produce results on which the CD can build in

its summer session. In this regard the inherent complementarity of the bilateral and multilateral spheres has been recognized by the USA and USSR both of whom have reported to the CD on the progress of the bilateral discussions. I hope that this process will continue.

I hope Mr. President that the working paper I have today tabled will not only provide further evidence of the substantive role which the Conference on Disarmament can play in achieving a comprehensive test ban, but will also give encouragement to the CD to establish an Ad Hoc committee in order to let us get on with the job expected of us.

Mr. President, let me turn now to the subject of Outer Space. Much of the existing international legal régime governing the military uses of outer space is the product of treaties and agreements negotiated and concluded by the two major space powers. While not directly engaging other countries, those treaties and agreements, most notably the ABM Treaty of 1972, constitute an important element of the existing legal framework, not least in their contribution to bringing about greater predictability in the military uses of the space environment and in their embodiment of a legal commitment to a cooperative approach to defining, through negotiation, agreed limits on the military uses of outer space. The Canadian Government firmly supports such an approach and

urges the USA and the USSR to continue to seek agreed ways to use outer space for national security purposes in a manner consistent with broad international security and stability, That is to say, the security of all of the nations and the peoples of the world.

However, arms control in relation to outer space has always had an important multilateral dimension. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 has been and remains the keystone of a legal framework which currently governs activities in outer space, including certain military activities. Canada believes that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. Canada's approach has also been premised on the belief that, in this multilateral context, verification issues will have a particular importance. Canada therefore welcomed the establishment for the first time in 1985 of an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the renewal of a mandate for it in each succeeding year. Canada had been active in making substantive contributions, particularly in the form of working papers, to the deliberations of this subsidiary body each year. These contributions reflect the results of a programme of sustained research in Canada under the auspices of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. President, Canada is deeply committed to promoting progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The

The Canadian emphasis is on the practical, which is one reason why we have identified research into the verification of arms control agreements as an area where we can make a useful contribution. As the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, has indicated effective verification procedures can not only help ensure compliance with arms control treaties but also facilitate their negotiation - hence Canada's work in developing verification procedures and technology that meet the practical requirements of arms control agreements actually under negotiations or envisaged.

I want now to focus on some of the research undertaken in Canada which comprises the joint efforts of government, the academic community and the commercial sector. This approach is nowhere better illustrated than in research relating to outer space. Canadian activities in this regard represent an attempt to develop and pursue an approach which is practical and innovative.

One of the major undertakings of the Verification Research Programme of the Department of External Affairs over the past several years has been to bring together teams of experts from government, universities and industry to focus on Canadian space technology and know-how in its application to the process of arms control verification. A Canadian concept, termed PAXSAT ('pax' being - as the Chairman of our Ad Hoc Committee can attest - Latin for peace), has emerged from these investigations.

This concept centres on assessing the feasibility of applying space-based remote sensing technology to the tasks of verification in the context of multilateral arms control and disarmament.

Canada's PAXSAT research has concentrated on two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to multilateral arms control verification. The first is space-to-space remote sensing, which we refer to as (PAXSAT 'A') dealing with verification of agreements involving space objects. The second, entailing space-to-ground remote sensing (which we refer to as PAXSAT 'B'), focuses on how to assist in the verification of agreements involving conventional forces. I want to discuss very briefly this distinctive Canadian concept in very general terms, outlining the context of multilateral arms control verification and some of the major assumptions underlying the Canadian PAXSAT projects.

From the outset, the PAXSAT research has recognized the important technical, political and military realities and trends in addressing the outer space issue. As a result, certain themes form core elements of the PAXSAT concept and contribute to the prospects of actually realizing such a multilateral verification system. These including the following:



- ° There must be the prospect of a significant multilateral agreement to warrant the level of sophistication of technology and the expenditure of funds required for the actual development of such an advanced technical verification system.
- ° Parties to such a multilateral agreement should have the option, at least, to participate in its verification procedures.
- ° Use of the PAXSAT system could be treaty-specific: it would be used only with respect to the agreements to which it expressly applied, as part of an overall verification process for those agreements alone.
- ° The treaty being verified would establish the requisite political authority for the verification mechanism and its operation.
- ° Technology requirements would be met collectively by participants and would, of course, be open to all states.
- ° PAXSAT should be based, to the extent possible, on existing openly available technology, without

requiring major costly improvements. The technology possessed by the Canadian commercial sector provided a base for the PAXSAT studies.

Although the PASXAT research is not yet complete, it has reach the point where its technical feasibility can begin to be assessed, at least in tentative ways. The workshop which Canada will host in Montreal next month, in which all delegations in this forum have been invited to participate, will provide occasion for further discussion and explanation of the concept. We also plan to make a report the CD in June following our recess.

Mr. President, if I may now turn to another issue of importance, the negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains the most active item on our agenda. Canada is pleased that the negotiating momentum which developed last year is being increased at the current CD session and we intend to continue our active participation in those negotiations. At the beginning of the summer part of the session the Canadian delegation will, as in the past, be providing to all participants our updated compendium of all CD documents relating to our chemical weapons negotiations.

Statements this week in this forum relating to further allegations of chemical weapons use in the Gulf war are tangible proof of the need to make deliberate haste in these negotiations. They also underline the importance of including in the treaty we are negotiating a provision for an unqualified, verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons. Canada commends the recent action of the United Nations Secretary-General to initiate an investigation of the latest allegations of chemical weapons use.

The verification of such allegations of chemical weapons or toxin weapons use is a subject to which Canada has devoted considerable research effort. We have initiated our own investigative activities in relation to certain such allegations in the past. We have drawn on this experience and that of others in making reports to the United Nations Secretary-General. In December 1985 we submitted to the Secretary-General a handbook dealing in a systematic and detailed way with various procedural aspects of investigations. This handbook was also subsequently put forward in this forum. Canada has continued its follow-on work in relation to other practical and technical aspects of such investigations. The result will be made available to the United Nations soon. Canada's activities in this regard reflect a pragmatic, operationally-oriented approach which we consider essential if effectively verifiable agreements are to be concluded. I believe that when we are in a position to report to

the Conference in June on the precise nature of the research we have conducted and the practical results which have emerged from it, every member of the CD will find the report of interest and of direct relevance to our chemical weapons negotiations.

The foregoing comments are intended to illustrate the approach which Canada has tried to follow consistently in the Conference on Disarmament. We have attempted to make concrete contributions through working papers and workshops, in lieu of rhetoric, concentrating on practical problems of verification of the arms control agreements we are together trying to achieve.