



CANADA

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at Geneva

La Mission Permanente du Canada
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à Genève

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BEFORE THE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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GENEVA

Mr. President,

As we are near the end of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to express some thoughts on a number of matters, not all of which are on our agenda. Since this may be the last occasion on which I shall address the Conference, as I shall be leaving Geneva shortly for another assignment, I shall follow the tradition of expressing personal as well as official views with a particular focus on where we stand as we approach the Third Special Session on Disarmament.

Mr. President,

Prospects for an INF Agreement,

On the most important issues on our agenda, and indeed the agenda of all thinking people, namely nuclear disarmament, we are light years away from where we were when I joined this forum four years ago. For those who may not be aware, I presented my credentials on September 23, 1983.

In my personal view, the progress in the INF talks, which shows real promise of a major breakthrough in the coming

months, has come about because of conceptual changes in the thinking of both parties.

In an article in the McGill Law Journal in 1983, I referred to a major Canadian policy statement by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs on February 1, 1983 in the Committee on Disarmament, (at which I was present in my capacity then as Ambassador for disarmament), which stressed the following points: that security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis; that attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work; that action produces reaction and in the end neither side achieves a long term gain. Applying these principles to the INF talks at a time when positions were still very far apart, the Canadian policy statement referred to in my article pointed out that such negotiations could only succeed if both parties accepted as their fundamental objective increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. It was suggested that it was not clear at that time that both sides had accepted mutual security as the basis of their negotiations.

That was the situation four years ago. I believe that it is no longer the case. Progress towards an INF agreement in the Nuclear and Space Talks now presents the real prospect of important

reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. An agreement on the basis of the global double zero formula would constitute a first nuclear disarmament agreement - since the SALT treaties are verifiable arms limitation agreements - that would completely remove an entire class of weapons from the nuclear arsenals of the USA and the USSR on a worldwide basis. The possibility that these objectives may finally be attainable attests to the validity of the principle of mutual security instead of unilateral advantage in the disarmament process. This key principle is even more crucial for progress in the area of strategic offensive and defensive arms.

It is equally interesting to note that the February 1983 Canadian policy statement in this forum emphasizing mutual security as the only acceptable basis for arms control and disarmament also stressed that "an attempt by any power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity". This statement was made at a time before such views were fashionable. Indeed, at the time it was made, contrary views were being expressed in articles and statements from influential sources. This concept has since become an agreed fundamental principle, as was proclaimed in the joint statement by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985 in the famous statement "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

Mr. President, some amongst us may consider this statement to be mere rhetoric. I do not. Some amongst us seem to see apparent inconsistencies between those words and the action taken by their authors. I do not. Some amongst us may say that action speaks louder than words. I do too. And that I suggest, is what is occurring. The world is not going to change overnight. But a beginning has been made in a major attempt to ensure that we continue to have a world in which to live, a world, if I may recall the historic post-war statement of Wendell Wilkie, which has long since become "one world".

Mr. President, there are other encouraging signs, as other representatives in this Conference have already pointed out. The successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference last year, coupled with current prospects for the successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations on Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF), have contributed to improving the atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament markedly and even, some have suggested, to the quickening of our pace at least in some areas. However, with the exception of the negotiations to ban chemical weapons, progress on the main issues on our agenda is not always evident from day to day or even from Session to Session. Nevertheless, the global picture appears more encouraging when viewed over a period of four years.

Verification

Mr. President, there is no issue which has proven more controversial than that of verification. Even if it is not on our agenda as a separate item, it is omnipresent in our work. During my time, Mr. President, this issue of verification, a long-standing Canadian priority, which we have regarded as the key to arms control and disarmament agreements, has gradually come to be universally accepted as the essential requirement for the conclusion of such agreements. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van Den Broek, pointed out in his statement to the CD last month, "It is increasingly recognized that asking for on-site inspection to verify a treaty with important security implications is reasonable and legitimate". He went on to say that "the growing consensus on the need for strict verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in general." Mr. President, it is stating the obvious to say that the Canadian Government fully shares that view. What may not be so obvious, is that such a statement could not have been made four years ago.

As I pointed out in my statement last month, verification performs a series of central functions, the most important being deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building, removal of uncertainty and treaty assessment. The success this year of the Working Group on Verification at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, under Canadian chairmanship, in reaching

provisional agreement on several verification principles, further testifies to the emerging international consensus on these issues. Thus while verification is sometimes portrayed as an obstacle in the way of a solution, for Canada it has always been a central part of the solution.

It is in this context that I welcome and acknowledge the importance of the statement made in this room by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, when he said "real verification" ought to involve "fool-proof, indisputable, reliable and the most strict and vigorous methods". The specific verification-related suggestions he made at that time in relation to chemical weapons, outer space and nuclear testing will be studied with care by Canadian authorities with these criteria in mind. I should like to come back later to the question of the standards to be sought in verification measures.

Chemical Weapons

Mr. President, when I came to Geneva in the fall of 1983 the framework of a future chemical weapons Convention had just been agreed under the chairmanship of my predecessor. Interestingly, in light of the hours - days - weeks - we spend on procedural questions related to mandates and subsidiary bodies, that level of progress had been reached in spite of the existence of an Ad Hoc

Committee without a negotiating mandate. I suggest that there is a lesson for us to be drawn from this, particularly in the context of the report of the Group of Seven on our working methods.

The following year the Chemical Weapons Ad Hoc Committee adopted a negotiating mandate and developed its first "Rolling Text" under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekeus. In the intervening years considerable progress has been achieved, article by article, in large measure due to the hard work, perseverance and initiative of successive chairmen of the Committee -- Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromatie -- and also the coordinators of the working groups as well as participating delegations which have contributed dozens of working papers. The process received a boost in 1984 with the tabling of a draft treaty by the USA. More recently major initiatives by the UK and the Soviet Union on the difficult issue of challenge inspection have brought us closer to resolving most remaining differences surrounding this problem.

We are again this year indebted to Ambassador Ekeus whose able and dynamic chairmanship has ensured that the Ad Hoc Committee on chemical weapons has achieved valuable results on key issues. Some speakers have suggested that the pace of negotiations has slowed down after the impressive gains in 1986 and the spring session this year. This is not so, in the view of my delegation; it is inevitable that precisely because we are making significant

progress in the elaboration of a convention that the pace tends to slow down as new gains become harder and the points under negotiation more difficult to resolve; moreover governments require time to reflect on the results obtained and to consider the need to adapt their negotiating approaches accordingly.

The recent announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the Soviet Union now agrees to a fully mandatory challenge inspection regime is a most important statement even when read in light of the five qualifying points made later by Ambassador Nazarkin in his elaboration of USSR views on this issue. Clearly, certain important details remain to be negotiated in this area as indicated in Ambassador Ekeus' report on his consultations. Inter alia, there needs to be agreement on the precise manner in which challenges would be initiated.

It has long been agreed that allegations of use of chemical weapons must be dealt with as promptly as possible and that the only adequate method of determining whether or not chemical weapons have been used is on-site inspection. Canada has considered this problem in much detail and this year, together with the delegation of Norway, we have provided a paper (CD/766) proposing an annex to Article IX on this important subject. We hope that it will be possible for the Ad Hoc Committee to give full

attention to the important question of the verification of CW use as soon as this is practicable.

Mr. President, we have also broken new ground in the CW negotiations this year in developing an understanding of the type of international organization required to oversee the implementation of a CW Convention. Much work remains to be done before this organization can become a reality. It is critical that we thoroughly understand what we expect such an organization to do before we can complete our work on Article VIII of the draft treaty. The Canadian delegation intends to contribute substantively to this as part of our work. I suggest, however, that the mere fact that we are collectively now addressing such issues is an encouraging sign and a clear mark of progress.

Mr. President, I now wish to speak to an issue central to the whole CW negotiation. Canada does not possess any chemical weapons and does not intend to produce or acquire such weapons. Two working papers tabled in this forum (CCD/434 of July 74 and CD/173 of April 81) reported that Canadian chemical weapons stocks had been destroyed. It is not in any spirit of polemics but with the explicit purpose of accelerating the negotiating process that I make the plea that all other delegations note this declaration and consider making comparable declarations and do so as soon as possible to build up our momentum and make clear to all the world

the seriousness of our intent. It goes without saying, in light of the foregoing, that we have made very important concrete progress in our negotiations on the Chemical Weapon Convention during the past four years.

Nuclear Test Ban

In the Canadian policy statement mentioned earlier it was emphasized that "the pursuit of a Comprehensive Test Ban is a fundamental - perhaps the fundamental - nuclear issue before the Committee on Disarmament". The attainment of this objective remains a major priority of the Canadian Government. Mr. President, the step-by-step approach favoured by Canada four years ago, an approach which now has the support of most delegations around this table, remains the most realistic in our view.

This is of course, another subject on which verification is crucial. As in other arms control and disarmament areas, adequate verification of a Comprehensive test ban would be of vital importance. There has however been considerable progress in the past four years in the development of a global seismic verification system, and the Group of Scientific experts is to be congratulated for its constructive work in this area during this period. A group which may have been considered somewhat controversial four years ago is now universally acknowledged as one of the corner-stones of our conference on this issue. The large-scale level II data

exchange experiment, which could take place as early as next year, will be especially important in demonstrating the feasibility of verification by seismic means. Canada attaches great importance to the effective utilization of waveform data, including through its adequate dissemination to all international data centres within a global system, for verification purposes. Here too, much has been achieved during the past four year. The Canadian Government has recently commissioned in depth research at the University of Toronto which has already produced interesting and promising results. I am therefore delighted that one of the scientific experts on my delegation, Dr. Peter Basham, has been chosen to coordinate this experiment. We know that he will receive the support and cooperation from others which the importance of the endeavour fully warrants.

There is no reason, Mr. President, why we cannot start practical work in an Ad Hoc Committee at the earliest possible opportunity in order to pursue these objectives . I would recall to my colleagues that rule 23 of our rules of procedure indicates that whenever the conference deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, the Conference may establish subsidiary bodies. I refer also to the report of the Group of Seven, on this very procedural issue. My delegation firmly believes that establishing a subsidiary body on NTB, as the informal proposal of the President for the month of April and his successors

have made clear, is essential for the effective performance of the functions of the Conference on Disarmament on NTB as it would allow us both to take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and to get down to substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues. We would hope that the proposal of the President for the month of April, my friend and colleague, Ambassador Veyvoda of Czechoslovakia, will form the basis for consultations during the intersessional period and early next session.

Outer Space

Mr. President, this is an issue on which it is more difficult to document substantive progress over the past four years. Nonetheless, we have not stood still, and we have not retrogressed. In 1983 the Canadian delegation urged the CD to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining the legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal regime, and made clear Canada's intention to participate actively in this work, urging the establishment of a subsidiary body on this subject. We were, of course, only one of many delegations to do so. Subsequently, we tabled a series of working papers intended to advance our work. The Ad Hoc Committee was first established in March 1985. Its work since then has been always arduous, sometimes productive, often interesting and frequently frustrating.

I would like to clarify, Mr. President, a point I made in an earlier statement when I referred to the regime of the high seas by way of analogy to the regime of outer space. The Canadian working paper tabled at that time did the same. I wish to stress that I did not refer to the Law of the Sea as a model, but by way of a law-making analogy. I wish to emphasize this point without developing it further, so as to avoid any misunderstanding concerning the Canadian position.

Given the complexity of many of the questions we have discussed under the existing outer space mandate, the Canadian Government considers that the best way to expedite our work is to put forth our views in the form of working papers. The purpose is to concretize discussions and negotiations, whether or not delegations agree with the papers tabled. Even disagreement clarifies issues, far more than general statements not focussed on specific proposals. In my statement of April 2 to the Conference I cited the series of working papers that Canada has put forward, and I do not need to do so again. I would however like to refer to our workshop in Montreal in May of this year, which I had the honour to chair, as another instance of our effort to make concrete contributions in this field. I wish to thank the many delegations who have expressed their appreciation for this workshop. The Canadian Paxsat presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee represented a

further effort to concentrate on the practical problems of verification.

In regard to the specific question of verification concerning outer space, I think that it is worth reiterating the point I made to the Conference in my statement of July 21. Careful negotiation, drafting and implementation of adequate and effective verification systems is essential if verification is not to become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening it or eliminating it. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Union is giving attention to this problem, as evidenced in the proposal outlined in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's speech to the Conference on Disarmament on August 6. We would encourage the Soviet Union to continue to give further thought to its proposal for an international verification system. We have particularly taken note that, as seems clear from this and other elements of Mr. Shevardnadze's statement, the Soviet Union accepts in principle that useful and practical work on aspects of verification can be done independently of a specific negotiating context, and without having previously reached agreement on the details of what is to be controlled. This is a view which has long been advocated by Canada, as well as some others.

By way of clarification, I should also emphasize, however, that, as reflected in our own PAXSAT feasibility study, in

our view the implementation of verification systems ought, at least in most circumstances, to be treaty specific. Canada has not advocated third party approaches involving verification activities outside the context of an agreement or by countries not party to an agreement. A corollary to this approach has been that Canada has not advocated the putting into place of verification systems or procedures in advance of the conclusion of an agreement. These comments are applicable, of course, not only to outer space but to nuclear test issues as well.

I would make an additional, final point about our work in relation to outer space. The working papers my delegation has submitted have pointed to the potential importance of careful drafting of definitions. The somewhat restrictive definition of outer space weapons which appears in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement of August 6 reinforces us in our view that such work could indeed be useful. This is of special importance because, as I have emphasized on other occasions, the central and essential purpose of any arms control agreement and its related verification system must be to enhance stability, and thus we should close the door on any possible area of ambiguity or uncertainty. I hope I have succeeded in indicating some progress even on outer space over the past four years.

Radiological Weapons

On radiological weapons I believe that we made a useful change in our working procedure in separating the two tracks and dealing with them separately and concurrently. It would clearly be over-optimistic however to suggest that significant progress was made on either track. It should be noted that we have done useful work in drawing up the annexes to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee and we should draw upon them as a basis for future work. It is clear, however, particularly in regard to the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense that some delegations will have to re-examine their positions in light of their expressed desire for an agreement. To suggest that we have made signified progress on these items over the past four years would be to mislead our governments and public opinion.

Mr. President, I cannot refrain from wondering aloud, in my purely personal capacity, whether all of us ought to re-examine our positions since Chernobyl, and, I might add, Bhopal, on the consequences of attacks on peaceful facilities, leaving aside whether these questions may properly be addressed in the CD or should be considered under the Geneva Red Cross Protocols.

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

I do not think anyone can underestimate the energy, tenacity and determination our distinguished colleague Ambassador Garcia Robles has brought to the Ad Hoc Committee on the

Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Much valuable work has been done this year and even if we have not been able to reach consensus on a document, we do consider that notable improvements have been made in the text of the draft CPD.

I regret however that on some parts of the programme there seems to be a narrower area of consensus now than what at least appeared to be the case at UNSSOD I. I appreciate that, if new consensus language actually improves previous consensus texts, then we need not treat such original texts as Holy Writ providing, of course, we all agree that the new amendments are improvements. I think it is accurate to say, therefore, that in spite of the forest of brackets, through which it is difficult to see the original trees, the fact that we are all seriously focusing on this issue is some evidence of progress.

Third Special Session on Disarmament

Mr. Chairman, this Conference is often referred to with pride as the single multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. Yet many have referred to its meager achievements since it was established in its present configuration in 1978 at the First SSOD. As we approach the Third Special Session on Disarmament we should quite properly ask ourselves if we have justified the trust the international community, the governments and the publics we represent, have all put in us when this forum

was created. The ultimate test of this Conference is its ability to make progress on significant arms control and disarmament measures. As I have attempted to illustrate, the CD has achieved some progress, and in the case of CW, even substantial progress during the last four years since SSOD II. However, no agreement on any issue has been concluded during the past four years -- indeed, the past ten years.

Why has there been no agreement in the last ten years? Obviously the CD does not work in a vacuum. It is therefore because it is influenced by the international environment which may not have been propitious, at least in the beginning of this 10 year period? Is it that its predecessor bodies concluded the easier non-armament agreements first, leaving the more difficult and complex arms control and disarmament issues to the CD? Is it because of our cumbersome procedures? Is it the fault of the major powers, as some allege, leaving themselves blameless and without responsibility? It would be too easy to try to justify our failures by any or all of these explanations. There is no doubt that we bear a collective responsibility, and as pointed out last week by Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, when we fail we are all the losers.

I suggest, however, that without ignoring the shortcomings or the failures of the CD, we should, in the future,

dwell less on its faults -- and those of each other -- and instead move forward on the basis of what could be accomplished with good will, determination, and skillful negotiation. I refer to concrete work, not rhetoric. If we are truly committed and determined, the only path to concrete progress and to resolving differences is to define the areas of common ground and then attempt step by step to expand on them. We need to concentrate on the practical and realizable. We might even ask ourselves if the Conference should concentrate on substantive areas where progress is feasible and consider leaving other areas such as RW, where there is little prospect for early progress, for a cooling off period.

Mr. President, SSOD III is less than a year away, and the CD will have to stand judgement on its performance. There is little doubt that the Special Session will reaffirm the critical role of this Conference in the multilateral process of arms control and disarmament negotiations as it did in 1982, not perhaps because of its accomplishments but because it has no other choice. The Conference should begin by making the best use possible of the remaining time to achieve progress on major issues and in particular, attempt to make a final breakthrough on chemical weapons.

Improved Efficient Functioning of the CD

Mr. President, as I have stated before in this forum, it is my firm conviction that with better working methods and a more widespread willingness to accept sensible accommodations of interests, it is in our power to improve the productiveness of the conference. The recent report of the Group of Seven, of which I am a member, made some practical suggestions on two procedural issues which have been at the source of much wasted time over the years; the establishment of subsidiary bodies and our report writing methods. It is regrettable that it was not possible for the Conference to agree on at least some of these suggestions. It is my impression, however, that the spirit in which the suggestions were made by the Group of Seven has influenced the last phase of our session, at least on parts of the CD report. Some other sound practical suggestions have also been made which could in the future help resolve problems relating to the establishment of subsidiary bodies. The possible solutions proposed, which obviously will require more time for reflection, would move the procedural debate from the mandate question to the work programme which in itself would be an improvement.

Obviously, many other procedural problems need to be resolved in addition to yearly re-establishment of subsidiary bodies and report writing. I referred to some of these in a plenary speech on August 30, 1985: the rigid application of the CD's rule of decision by consensus to procedural issues; the

monthly rotation of the CD presidency, yearly rotation of Ad Hoc Committee and working group chairmen, as well as frequent rotation of group coordinators, which do not favour continuity. These, I feel certain, will eventually appear in the programme of future work of the Group of Seven. Although we should not give undue weight to procedural matters, it behoves us to ensure that we have done everything in our power to remove procedural obstacles to the effective performance of this Conference. It would be a mistake to rely on the next Special Session on Disarmament to solve these problems for us.

Mr. President, before concluding, I should like to disclaim any attempt at a definitive overview of the work of the Conference and its predecessor during the past four years. It would be presumptuous to attempt such a task. Nonetheless, I have attempted to indicate where there is evidence or some progress in our work and where there is not.

It may appear to some that there has been more achieved in bilateral negotiations between the super powers than in multilateral negotiations in the CD. For my part, Mr. President, I have expressed my views on many occasions on the importance of the symbiotic interrelationship between bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations, more particularly in an article in which I addressed that question in the Fortieth Anniversary issue of the United Nations periodical "Disarmament". In brief, as indicated in that article, I believe that it can be demonstrated that even the existing purely bilateral arms control agreements reflect considerable multilateral input, and, of course, vice versa. So let us not minimize the importance of our efforts, particularly in the case of concrete contributions such as working papers and the efforts to find common ground based on them. Even our rhetoric can be of some use in indicating the international climate.

What is new and, in my view, of great importance is the extent to which the major powers are using this forum for high-level policy exchanges concerning their bilateral negotiations. This is a most welcome development. It suggests, of course, that it is incumbent upon the rest of us to take this forum at least as seriously.

Nature of the Transaction

Mr. President, I should now like to address the basic purpose of our work, and in so doing I will draw upon a recent statement I made in a conference in Ottawa. It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To ask states to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as an alternative measure of protecting their security is to demand of them a very serious and difficult decision. In effect a state accepts a treaty in lieu of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely important undertaking since a primary responsibility of any government must be to protect the security of its country, however defined or perceived. Given the traditional -- and contemporary -- concern with national security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations while at the same time demonstrating its own good faith. In a world where there are relatively few internationally effective sanctions, verification inevitably must play a critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective and does not become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.

Role of Verification

Events of recent years have underscored the crucial importance in certain arms control agreements of compliance with their provisions, and, thus, of verification of compliance. It is axiomatic that in an imperfect world, just as there can be no arms control without confidence in compliance, there can be no confidence in compliance without adequate verification. It follows that verification can be seen as the very foundation upon which the whole edifice of arms control agreements rests.

We have seen how even clear cut and specific verification mechanisms in some multilateral agreements such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which is not merely an arms control agreement but a genuine disarmament agreement, have been proven inadequate to dispel suspicions of violations. We have seen in the Gulf War the consequences of the absence of any verification process in the 1925 Geneva Poison Gas Protocol, which is, admittedly, only a non-first-use treaty -- of the kind advocated by many for the control of nuclear weapons. We have also seen how evidence derived from the verification mechanisms of some bilateral agreements (such as the ABM Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty) can prove ambiguous, and give rise to disputes and suspicion rather than confidence and good faith in dealing with situations suggesting controversial activities.

These few examples -- in multilateral and bilateral agreements -- demonstrate not only the importance of verification

and compliance, but the political sensitivity of the whole process of detecting and handling events suggesting possible non-compliance. Indeed, recent concerns about verification and compliance seem in some cases to have eroded confidence among the parties to arms control agreements rather than reinforced it. Nonetheless, it is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions and the establishment of the necessary implementing mechanisms is essential to preventing such a deterioration of confidence. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests.

In my Ottawa statement, I pointed out that: "Clearly, no verification can be totally fool-proof. A verification mechanism must be able to detect, beyond a reasonable doubt, any violation of an agreement that would permit a state to acquire, or clearly indicate an intention to acquire, a military capability threatening to the national security of any other party".

Mr. President, I analyzed in that statement, at some length, the standard of verification which might be acceptable. Since I have circulated copies of my Ottawa statement to all delegations, I will not take the time of the Conference to read it into the record.

Conclusion

Mr. President, in concluding, may I say what a pleasure it has been to work with you, with the Secretary-General, and with all my colleagues in other delegations, and the Secretariat, including both those now present and those who have left us. It has been my pleasant experience to enjoy cordial relations with each of you, irrespective of differences in our political positions and our perceptions of one another's positions. That, of course, is the only way we can work successfully to ensure that with the spirit of camaraderie which prevails in the Conference we can develop also a spirit of conciliation which opens the way to concrete substantive progress. Ultimately, even if we cannot always influence policies made in capitals, we can ensure that we remain sensitive to changes and shifts in position; that we are aware of new developments and particularly new openings; and that we are alert to opportunities to develop and expand common ground. So, Mr. President, I must say, in my own defence, and in a kind of right of reply to many of my friends that, yes, I have indeed given many working luncheons at which I have made you all work as well as eat, but I make no apologies, in that at least I have benefited from these informal exchanges, and I hope that others have been able to do so as well.